United Nations S/2010/611

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 December 2010

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1923 (2010), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) until 31 December 2010 and called upon me, inter alia, to complete the withdrawal of all uniformed and civilian MINURCAT components other than those required for the Mission's liquidation by that date. The report covers developments since the issuance of my previous report on MINURCAT, dated 14 October 2010 (S/2010/529). It provides an assessment of the security and humanitarian situations in eastern Chad and the security situation in the north-eastern area of the Central African Republic, progress towards the fulfilment by the Government of Chad of the tasks and benchmarks set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1923 (2010), the implementation of the mandate of MINURCAT, including preparations for and completion of its withdrawal, and an assessment of key lessons learned in the context of MINURCAT.

II. Security

2. The general security situation in Chad remained relatively calm. There were, however, a number of isolated incidents. On 6 November, five unidentified armed men attacked two trucks belonging to a local MINURCAT contractor 55 kilometres north of Goz Beida (Dar Sila) and shot one of the drivers dead. On 9 November, a Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS) team investigating the theft of a refugee's motorbike in the vicinity of the Gaga refugee camp near Abéché (Ouaddai) by two armed individuals in uniform were engaged in a firefight with two suspects. One DIS officer and the suspects were killed.

III. Humanitarian situation

3. The humanitarian needs in eastern Chad are immense. In that region, some 70 humanitarian organizations continued to provide assistance to some 255,000 refugees, more than 137,500 internally displaced persons and about 43,000 returnees, as well as a host population of 150,000. The destruction of more than 104,000 hectares of crops during the rainy season rendered the population vulnerable in

10-65836 (E) 061210

Please recycle

southern, central and eastern Chad. Across the Sahelian belt in Chad, an estimated 1.6 million people now face food insecurity and malnutrition. Areas particularly affected in the east include Assoungha, Djourf Al Ahmar, Kimiti and Ouaddai

4. Humanitarian actors and MINURCAT mobilized resources to help the Government alleviate the situation. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) released emergency stocks of non-food items at refugee sites and surrounding villages affected by the floods. The Mission's logistical support facilitated the delivery of around 10 tons of humanitarian aid to the internally displaced persons in Loboutique (Dar Sila). Similar assistance was provided to humanitarian assessment missions deployed to Mongororo, Kerfi, Am Timan, Tiero and Marena, and humanitarian staff and cargo were provided to Daha and Haraze, which were accessible only by helicopter.

IV. Responsibility of the Government of Chad for the protection of civilians and United Nations and humanitarian organization personnel and assets

5. The Government continued to implement its plan for the protection of civilians in eastern Chad as outlined in the letter to the President of the Security Council dated 7 September 2010 (S/2010/470). It entails three pillars: the national army garrisoned along the border and the joint Chadian-Sudanese border monitoring force; the territorial gendarmerie with the Chadian Garde nationale et nomade and the joint disarmament force; and, at the core, DIS.

6. The national plan for the sustainment of DIS was revised. In October, the Government shared the updated plan and revised budget estimates with the Council (S/2010/536) and with representatives of the diplomatic community and partner organizations in N'Djamena. Of particular note is the provision for the establishment of a dedicated DIS administrative and management unit from January 2011 with approximately 130 personnel and 2011 budgetary requirements of some $21 million. The Government has committed to funding all DIS personnel costs (salaries, stipends and various allowances), estimated at approximately $7 million, or 33 per cent of the budget. It is, however, seeking $14 million in donor assistance to support logistical requirements (estimated at $12.6 million) and the above-mentioned national facilitation structure (estimated at $1.4 million). Furthermore, the Government has requested assistance from the United Nations for the mobilization and management of donor funds, as well as additional technical assistance to DIS and its support structure. This assistance entails the recruitment of expert advisers in police oversight and logistics. DIS remains fragile, however. In order to maximize the sustainability of DIS, MINURCAT has endeavoured to transfer the bulk of its DIS mentoring, administration and logistical support programmes to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNHCR.

7. The Government has indicated that Coordination nationale d'appui au déploiement de la force internationale à l'est du Tchad (CONAFIT), established as the Mission's primary national interlocutor, will cease its functions once the Mission withdraws from Chad on 31 December 2010. It intends to establish a new structure, the Coordination nationale pour le soutien aux humanitaires et au DIS, to interact with humanitarian partners and other key actors. The mandate of and arrangements for this new body and the modalities of its work are being finalized by the

Government. In the east, coordination with humanitarian actors on security issues, joint analysis and escorts is provided by the Government's recently established Bureaux de sécurisation et des mouvements, now functioning in 12 locations.

8. To promote a shared understanding on the part of the Government and the various stakeholders of their respective responsibilities for the protection of civilians, the second in a series of forums was conducted by CONAFIT, in collaboration with MINURCAT, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNDP and UNHCR, with Government representatives and humanitarian actors on 11 October in N'Djamena. In Abéché and Hadjer-Hadid (Ouaddaï), similar forums were held on 12 and 13 November on the subjects of humanitarian space and sustainable solutions for internally displaced persons. A fourth forum took place on 28 November in Goz Beida (Dar Sila) on the issue of early recovery. A fifth forum is scheduled to be held in N'Djamena in December to summarize the outcomes of the previous four.

A. Security and protection of civilians in danger

9. From 24 September to 12 November, DIS reports having conducted 1,964 day and night patrols in and around all refugee camps, some sites for internally displaced persons sites and in towns in eastern Chad where humanitarian actors operate. DIS recorded 72 infractions of the law and arrested 27 suspects. Twelve suspects were transferred to the local gendarmerie for referral to the justice system.

10. On 25 October, a two-month induction training of 200 new DIS officers, including 16 women, commenced in N'Djamena. These are the first recruits for whom training is entirely provided by Chadian DIS instructors, under the general supervision of MINURCAT police. On completion of this training, the overall strength of DIS is expected to reach some 1,000 personnel.

B. Facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel

11. DIS report having conducted 1,477 security escorts for humanitarian actors over the past two months. There was one carjacking of a vehicle belonging to an international non-governmental organization (NGO) on the road between N'Djamena and Ati some 280 kilometres west of Abéché. No one was harmed and Chadian authorities have since recovered the vehicle.

12. In a development cited as being unrelated to the withdrawal of MINURCAT, two international non-governmental organizations have announced their intention to depart the Dar Sila region by December, which they attributed to a combination of the reprioritization of programmatic activities to other locations in Chad and the lack of resources. One NGO suspended its activities in Adé near the border with the Sudan because of insecurity there.

V. Progress by the Government of Chad towards benchmarks established by the Security Council

13. With the Mission's operations winding down, the ability to independently verify any progress made by the Government towards attaining the benchmarks

established by the Security Council for the protection of civilians is extremely limited. The Mission is no longer in a position to visit the majority of refugee camps and sites for internally displaced persons or to observe the performance of the national security institutions, including DIS, providing protection for civilians. Accordingly, my observations necessarily comprise the accounts of humanitarian actors, as well as national and local authorities. These accounts illustrate the efforts of the Government of Chad towards achieving the benchmarks established by the Security Council, as outlined below.

A. Voluntary return of internally displaced persons in secure and sustainable conditions

14. In early November Chad ratified the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (the Kampala Convention). The Convention imposes legal obligations on signatory States with regard to internally displaced persons in their respective territories.

15. Prior to the 2010 rainy season, some 43,000 internally displaced persons had returned to their villages of origin in the Dar Sila region and in the Assoungha department in the Ouaddai region. Subsequently there have been no significant returns. In recent months Chadian authorities, notably CONAFIT, have expressed confidence that the causes of displacement in the east have been addressed successfully and have stated their intention to support, together with the international community, durable solutions for internally displaced persons, namely voluntary return, local integration or relocation elsewhere in the country.

16. Internally displaced persons at several major sites have expressed apprehension over the possibility of returning to their places of origin. In most cases they cited concerns over security, as returning would involve movement to areas in close proximity to the Sudanese border and to locations where intercommunity tensions still remain. During an intercommunity dialogue organized by the Government on 28 October in Hadjer-Hadid (Ouaddai) (with support from UNHCR, a local NGO partner, Eirene, and MINURCAT), leaders of internally displaced persons stated that further returns to their places of origin were conditional on the Government providing assurances of security and sustained development assistance.

B. Demilitarization of refugee camps

17. Since the deployment of the joint Chadian-Sudanese border monitoring force in the early months of 2010, UNHCR has consistently reported fewer sightings of armed elements moving within the camps.

C. Security for refugees, internally displaced persons, civilians and humanitarian workers with respect to international human rights standards

18. According to assessments by humanitarian actors and government authorities, the overall security situation in refugee camps and sites for internally displaced persons has remained relatively calm. Incidents of recruitment of children by armed

elements were relatively few (see para. 26), but UNHCR received regular reports of incidents of sexual and gender-based violence, many related to the use of alcohol.

19. DIS maintained operations in and around all refugee camps. Its gender units, however, have yet to become fully operational at all sites. During the reporting period, training was provided to 29 DIS instructors on international humanitarian law by the International Committee of the Red Cross and to 108 DIS officers on children's rights in emergency situations by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). On 25 October, 26 DIS officers received training from the Mission in Iriba on human rights, specifically on the protection of women and children.

VI. Implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

20. During the reporting period, the Mission took the final steps towards consolidating and transferring the support of its civilian activities, where feasible, to the Government, the United Nations country team and other relevant actors. On 15 October, the military component of MINURCAT ceased its operational activities and assumed responsibility for the static protection of United Nations personnel, premises and assets; situational awareness of the Mission's locations; and the provision of limited escorts to United Nations convoys undertaking enabling functions, and provided limited support for the extraction and medical evacuation of United Nations personnel.

A. Support to the Détachement intégré de sécurité

21. MINURCAT is in the final stages of the consolidation of support to DIS and the handover of functions to the Government of Chad. The Mission has focused on enhancing the skills of DIS in the essentials of driving, basic car mechanics and communications: 87 DIS officers have been trained in the use of HF radio; 60 in the use of office computer software; 29 in basic car mechanics; and, 70, including 20 women, in driving skills. As at 24 November the strength of the United Nations police stood at 87 officers in N'Djamena and 7 in Abéché.

B. Rule of law

22. UNDP, together with MINURCAT, facilitated, with funding from the Government of Germany, the establishment of three pilot legal aid clinics in eastern Chad (Goz Beida, Koukou Angarana and Abéché). UNDP completed the competitive selection process for national NGOs to operate these pilot legal aid clinics.

23. The Mission also logistically supported the deployment of newly appointed judges and prosecutors to the Court of Appeals in Abéché. Through quick-impact projects, MINURCAT has constructed courthouses in Adré, Goz Beida and Hadjer-Hadid, and the courthouse in Goz Beida, as well as the first instance tribunal of Iriba, has been equipped with furniture and office material.

24. MINURCAT continued to offer on-the-job training and mentoring to national prison officials on international standards in prison management and administration

and general prison development strategies in N'Djamena, Abéché, Adré, Iriba and Goz Beida, as well as prison headquarters. The Iriba prison rehabilitation project is proceeding on course, and the new facility was expected to be ready for use by the end of November 2010. MINURCAT, in collaboration with the World Health Organization, delivered essential drugs and equipment to Adré prison for the purpose of operating an infirmary there.

C. Human rights

25. During the reporting period, MINURCAT assisted the Government in its efforts to finalize its national action plan for human rights and establish mechanisms for the implementation of the outcome of the universal periodic review and the recommendations of human rights treaty bodies. It also provided mentoring to civil society organizations in eastern Chad and to the regional delegates of the Ministry of Human Rights and Promotion of Liberties.

D. Child protection

26. DIS reported the arrest of a group of 11 persons on suspicion of involvement in child recruitment in the Goz Amer refugee camp (Dar Sila). Five suspects, allegedly the ringleaders, were transferred to the joint Chadian-Sudanese border monitoring force. The recruitment activity, which took place in September, was reportedly politically motivated and utilized youth organizations to target boys and girls. The Government of Chad suspended the activities of the organizations implicated.

E. Gender

27. The Minister of Social Action and the Vice-President of the National Assembly, with assistance from MINURCAT and UNICEF, participated in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1325 (2000) in New York. MINURCAT continued to assist the Ministry in finalizing a national strategy for conflict resolution within the framework agreed upon in the national forum held in September. The Mission also assisted in the organization of national sexual and gender-based sensitization events in Hadjer-Hadid in October and in Arkoum and Adré in November.

F. Civil affairs

28. MINURCAT continued to consolidate its reconciliation activities in anticipation of handing them over to Chadian authorities and other partners. In the Ouaddai region, MINURCAT and UNHCR sponsored intercommunity dialogue on 28 October in Hadjer-Hadid, south of Farchana, to build confidence and promote voluntary returns of internally displaced persons. MINURCAT handed over an administrative building, refurbished through a quick-impact project, to the local authorities in Hadjer-Hadid, as well as two wells in the resettlement communities of Khomme and Dewer.

G. HIV/AIDS

29. MINURCAT consolidated its efforts to mainstream HIV/AIDS awareness and prepared to hand over its activities to the United Nations country team. An HIV sensitization programme, funded by a quick-impact project and implemented with UNHCR, sensitized some 11,907 refugees and internally displaced persons in Goz Beida, Goz Amer, Koukou Angarana and Farchana (Djabal, Trejine, Brejine and Gaga). In Abéché, 90 religious leaders, including 30 women, were trained as focal points to raise awareness about HIV.

H. Mine action

30. In preparation for the withdrawal of MINURCAT, the number of mine action survey and clearance teams was reduced from four to three (now located in Abéché, Farchana and Goz Beida). A public awareness campaign on landmines and explosive remnants of war, as well as the supporting reporting hotline, has been maintained. Posters and flyers to raise awareness of the danger of handling landmines and explosive remnants of war were handed over to CONAFIT and the Chadian National Demining Centre for further circulation to schools, markets, public places and local authorities.

31. The outstanding tasks — surveying more than 3,000 kilometres of road, clearing 32 battlefield areas and completing more than 150 general mine action assessments — cannot be completed before year's end. Those activities will be handed over to the Chadian National Demining Centre. Discussions are under way with the Centre regarding its assumption of responsibility for the completion of the remaining tasks. In this context, the Centre continued to receive technical advisory, resource mobilization and programmatic support from UNDP on the implementation of projects, including a large-scale technical survey that will help to determine the extent of the remaining contamination and the resources required to address it.

I. Military mandate of the Mission

32. Pursuant to resolution 1923 (2010), on 15 October the Mission's military component entered a recovery and repatriation phase in Chad and the Central African Republic. The Mission's withdrawal plan provides for the repatriation of the entire Force in four groups by 17 December. In addition to the military component's camp closures reported in the previous period, MINURCAT has now closed Koukou Angarana (Sector South), Iriba (Sector North) and Birao (in the north-eastern area of the Central African Republic) on 31 October and 14 and 15 November, respectively. Subsequently, Goz Beida (Sector South) was closed on 27 November and Farchana (Sector North) on 30 November. At the time of publication, United Nations military elements were present only in Abéché and N'Djamena.

VII. Central African Republic

33. During the period under review, the security situation in the north-eastern part of the Central African Republic remained stable, yet fragile. In anticipation of the withdrawal of MINURCAT, I requested the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

to conduct a threat assessment of the area of operations in the north-eastern area of the Central African Republic, the key findings of which were shared orally with the Security Council in its closed consultations on 20 October. In brief, the risks posed in the area are attributable to a variety of governance issues (ethnic, economic and political). The attacks in September and October against villages in the MINURCAT area of operations by unidentified armed elements may have been perpetrated by a single group of 40 to 60 members of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Despite the notorious menace of LRA, the threat posed by this single group is not assessed to be as significant as other internal factors. The major source of insecurity comes from banditry and transients who bring arms to sell, but the most urgent threat stems from armed internal political opposition groups (especially the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP)).

34. In anticipation of the Mission's withdrawal, the Government of the Central African Republic made it clear that it was not in favour of the presence of an international force. It expressed its intention to reinforce its own military in the north-east, but the national forces lack basic equipment and training. The Government made a number of approaches to possible bilateral partners to provide capacity-building support to its national forces.

35. As noted in paragraph 32 above, MINURCAT completed its withdrawal from Birao on 15 November 2010, when it transferred its two campsites to the Government of the Central African Republic. Work on the main road between the airstrip and the town of Birao was completed, and the landing strip was left in good order and is unlikely to require significant maintenance until the 2011 rainy season. The Government of the Central African Republic reportedly reinforced the presence of its national forces garrisoned in Birao to a total strength of approximately 150 troops. On 24 November, however, CPJP allegedly attacked the positions of the national security forces in Birao with the intention of seizing equipment and supplies. The national authorities announced the withdrawal of its forces from the town, leaving CPJP in control. At least four soldiers were killed.

VIII. Mission support

36. MINURCAT, on the closure of its camps in its forward bases in eastern Chad (Farchana, Goz Beida, Guereda and Iriba) and in the north-eastern part of the Central African Republic (Birao), transferred to the Governments of the two countries camp infrastructure as well as some assets, in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions. This transfer is intended to contribute to the continuation of activities related to the protection of civilians and humanitarian actors. Following the closure of the camps in Goz Beida and Farchana on 27 and 30 November, respectively, the Mission has consolidated its presence in N'Djamena and Abéché to prepare for liquidation.

37. Since the end of the rainy season, road conditions have improved in the area of operations, which has enhanced the Mission's capacity to extract and move United Nations- and contingent-owned equipment. The Mission's drawdown of civilian staff has progressed on schedule, with the number expected to decrease to 130 international staff, 240 national staff and 50 United Nations Volunteers by the end of December.

38. Detailed planning is well advanced for the mission liquidation period, which is scheduled to last until 30 April 2011. The main challenges during the period will include the completion of the DIS support infrastructure projects mandated by Security Council resolution 1923 (2010), the transfer out or local disposal of the remaining United Nations-owned equipment, the termination of MINURCAT support contracts and the phase-out of the MINURCAT civilian establishment. The successful achievement of these tasks will call for careful management by the mission liquidation team.

39. Regarding the Council-mandated construction of DIS stations, including the drilling of wells and work on the police academy, progress was reviewed at the fourth meeting of the Government of Chad-United Nations High-level Working Group convened in N'Djamena on 10 November. The Working Group considered the report of an earlier site inspection conducted by its representatives.

40. The first phase of construction at the police academy in N'Djamena is complete. MINURCAT has not been able to initiate the second phase, the construction of 11 training classrooms, because of lack of funding. The construction of 6 police stations and 11 police posts is projected to be completed in early 2011. The procurement process for the construction of the DIS posts in the Touloum and Iridimi refugee camps has been completed, and construction is projected to be finished by the end of April 2011. A contractor has commenced the drilling of wells for DIS in Abéché and will soon begin drilling in all 16 locations. All work is to be completed before the end of April, and a further inspection is scheduled for early December 2011.

IX. Completion and transfer of key Mission activities to the Government of Chad, the United Nations country team and other partners

41. The following proposed post-MINURCAT arrangements and tasking of responsibilities was taken up in November at the monthly meeting of the High-level Working Group. Final agreement is expected to be reached in the Group's December meeting.

A. Programmes

42. Pursuant to resolution 1923 (2010), MINURCAT initiated a series of exchanges with the Government and the United Nations country team, as well as many other key actors, to identify means for the continuation of the Mission's critical civilian activities related to the protection of civilians and early recovery, as well as their sustainability. Activities were carried out in the areas of justice and prisons, sexual and gender-based violence, child protection, human rights monitoring, promotion and reporting and mine action. In addition, local reconciliation initiatives were carried out in eastern Chad. Discussions focused on the workplans of the individual MINURCAT civilian units with a view to identifying activities that could be completed by 31 December and those that needed to continue. The selection of activities to be continued was guided largely by the priorities set out in the Government's Programme global de relance à l'est du Tchad,

which was developed with support from development partners. The programme focuses on addressing the challenges facing internally displaced persons and host communities in the areas of return, relocation or reintegration in eastern Chad.

43. The Government has undertaken to continue the Mission's activities in support of the justice and prisons sectors in eastern Chad within the framework of its existing justice programme (Programme d'appui à la justice au Tchad), which is supported by the European Union and the Government of Germany and implemented in coordination with UNDP. The Government and civil society organizations have also undertaken to ensure the continuation of the Mission's human rights activities in eastern Chad, particularly through the regional delegates of the Ministry of Human Rights and civil society organizations, such as Le Cercle des ONG. In accordance with the findings of the needs assessment mission conducted in July 2010 by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in which the Government, civil society actors and other partners urged support for Chad on human rights issues, the Government will continue to support local reconciliation initiatives previously undertaken jointly with MINURCAT. Activities aimed at fighting against sexual and gender-based violence will continue under the leadership of the United Nations Population Fund in collaboration with UNICEF and UNHCR. Mine action activities will be taken over in April 2011. Regarding HIV/AIDS, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS will take over activities undertaken by MINURCAT and ensure sustainability of the achievements reached. Local reconciliation activities will be continued and sustained through the UNDP programme on local governance. Since the 2011 transition plan is intended to bridge the gaps created by the departure of MINURCAT, all these activities will be further sustained through the 2012-2015 United Nations Development Assistance Framework.

B. Détachement intégré de sécurité

44. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1923 (2010), MINURCAT has been intensively consolidating its support to DIS, which will be transferred to the Government by 31 December. As at 15 October, the police component necessarily ceased accompanying DIS on patrols and escorts. All administrative tasks, such as training, discipline, payroll and budget preparation, were transferred to DIS in October. Since then, DIS has prepared its own payroll, which has been endorsed by MINURCAT before processing.

45. As reported in paragraph 6, in October the Government of Chad presented an updated plan for the sustainment of DIS. UNDP and UNHCR continue to work closely with the relevant national authorities to establish a mechanism for the mobilization and management of donor support after 1 January. UNDP and UNHCR have designed a package of additional technical assistance and operational support for DIS in 2011. It is, however, not feasible to replicate the same level of support provided by MINURCAT.

46. Under the proposed package, UNDP will administer a "basket fund" in support of DIS; establish a technical assistance programme for the DIS administrative and financial section; carry out procurement for the operational aspects of DIS (fuel, spare parts and maintenance, information and communications technology equipment); and provide technical and administrative support to the Government

institutional oversight and management structure. UNHCR will provide support to DIS for day-to-day operations, such as management and maintenance of the vehicle fleet, maintenance of radio equipment, upkeep of facilities (police stations and posts, water wells), and the construction of four new police stations in the Salamat and Gore areas.

47. With regard to donor support for DIS, encouragingly, several existing donors have expressed an interest in continuing their financial contributions in 2011. In addition, UNDP and UNHCR have jointly submitted a proposal, endorsed by the Government, to access funding under the Immediate Response Facility of the Peacebuilding Fund. This funding, if approved, could be used to continue DIS operations for the first months of 2011, pending the mobilization and disbursement of critical donor support.

X. Lessons learned in the context of the Mission

48. In paragraph 27 of its resolution 1923 (2010), the Security Council requested that I provide an assessment of lessons learned in the context of MINURCAT. The assessment focused on the following areas: the establishment of a mission in the framework of tenuous host-Government consent; the necessity for a common, shared understanding of the concept of protection of civilians; knowledge of the context, planning and management of a peacekeeping mission; DIS sustainability; and communication and the management of expectations. The study entailed a desk review of documents and reports related to MINURCAT, extensive interviews with Government officials at local and central levels, civil society organizations, community leaders, members of the diplomatic community in Chad, officials of the United Nations country team and current and former MINURCAT and Secretariat personnel. The key findings of the study are outlined below.

A. Sustainable consent

49. Concerned by the serious and deteriorating humanitarian situation in Darfur and eastern Chad and its impact on the security and safety of civilians and on regional stability, the Security Council authorized, in its resolution 1778 (2007), the deployment of MINURCAT and an international military force in eastern Chad and the north-eastern area of the Central African Republic, providing for a European bridging force for one year. Prior to that point, the Government of Chad consistently voiced serious reservations about accepting the presence of an international military component. Chad repeatedly expressed its strong preference that any international presence be civilian in nature, that it assist in the protection of refugees and internally displaced persons and that it contribute to economic development in the east. The Secretariat conveyed this view to the Council, and in so doing emphasized its conclusion, based on assessment missions, that the conditions necessary for the deployment of a peacekeeping force were not present. It was only in late 2007, just prior to the adoption of the above-mentioned mandate, that the Government of Chad accepted the presence, for a duration of one year, of an international bridging force to be known as the European Union force in Chad and the Central African Republic.

50. Lingering reservations in the Government with regard to an international military presence once again came to the fore in 2008, during discussions on the

United Nations military component relieving the interim European Union force. There were protracted discussions, as the Government sought to determine the mandate, size, location and rules of engagement of a United Nations force. This delayed the Security Council's decision, in its resolution 1861 (2009), until 14 January 2009. The troop strength initially recommended to the Council by the Secretariat was ultimately reduced in size, but no reduction of the area of operations was authorized. The force's capability, therefore, was vested in a concept of operations heavily dependent on military helicopters to ensure mobility.

51. With the transfer of authority from the European Union to the United Nations set for 15 March 2009, the Secretariat had two months, rather than the minimum established requirement of six months, to obtain firm commitments from Member States for the necessary troop deployments. The short time frame allowed little time for potential troop contributors to secure the necessary equipment and enabling forces. In the early months of deployment, the multiple problems that plagued troop deployments challenged the Mission's effectiveness and credibility on the ground. This was brought more sharply into focus in May 2009 by the Government's utilization of its newly acquired and significant military assets to decisively defeat an incursion by a Chadian armed opposition group. This action, coupled with the incipient improvement in the relations between Chad and the Sudan and the continuing slow deployment of the military component of the Mission, prompted some actors, internally and in the region, to question the continued relevance of the United Nations military force in eastern Chad.

52. Furthermore, the establishment of MINURCAT was characterized by a discrepancy between the expectations and requests of the host Government and the actual structure and purpose of the Mission. In order to address the Government's reservations about an operation whose mandate was not in accordance with its wishes and objectives, the Mission resorted to a number of coping and mitigating strategies. These included committing to substantial projects that at times proved difficult, or even impossible, to carry out, thereby further undermining the trust and confidence of the host Government. In addition, MINURCAT, both before and after the establishment of its military component, invested heavily in DIS with a view to its assumption of a portion of the security responsibilities entrusted to the international military forces the deployment of which faced delays. Finally, the Mission agreed to provide, within existing resources, a level of support to DIS that will be difficult to sustain after the departure of MINURCAT.

53. The following lessons can be drawn: even when freely given, the consent of a host Government should be nurtured in order to ensure sustainability. Consent is reversible, especially when the conditions in the country and/or the subregion change significantly during the life of the mission. The weight of regional considerations in host Government consent should not be underestimated. Neither should the consistency of the support of key Member States that help to secure the host Government's initial consent. An operation such as MINURCAT, conceived and deployed under stress, in disregard of the foregoing observations, can become hostage to pressures and contradictions that will distract it from its intended objectives, impair its overall performance and erode its credibility.

54. Sustained consent by and effective cooperation with a host Government remains essential in order for a mission to implement its mandate and attain its

objectives. The manner in which it is secured and maintained must not serve to erode the principles of the Organization.

B. Shared understanding of the protection of civilians

55. MINURCAT was established primarily for the purpose of contributing to the protection of civilians and did not have a political mandate. Its deployment took place at a time when there was no common understanding of the protection of civilians in the context of a United Nations peacekeeping environment. Consequently, each actor on the ground had different expectations and interpretations of what protection should entail, based largely on the perspective of their organizational goals rather than on a shared understanding.

56. The lack of a shared understanding notwithstanding, within the Mission, the mandate was clearer with regard to the respective protection roles of its military and police components. The policing of refugees in the camps and key towns was achieved through the provision of support to DIS, while the military provided an enabling security environment by patrolling a wide area. This enabling environment allowed humanitarian actors to enhance their respective activities for the protection of civilians. Furthermore, the Mission's civilian activities to strengthen human security were generally well regarded by national partners, including local beneficiaries and the Government.

57. The following lessons can be drawn: a shared and practical understanding of the protection of civilians must be developed and the contributions of key partners identified in an integrated strategy that is clearly elaborated during the predeployment planning phase. Once a mission is deployed, such a strategy should be routinely reviewed on the ground with the host Government and the United Nations country team to take into account local developments without jeopardizing organizational values and norms.

C. Knowledge of context, planning and management

58. The Mission suffered from operational and logistical constraints owing to the harsh physical environment. This was compounded by an initial support structure arrangement that was not ultimately endorsed and by subsequent efforts to redress logistical constraints that similarly suffered from lack of agreement on support structures. The difficult environmental conditions challenged the Mission's capability to attract personnel and achieve sufficient staffing levels, notably in such key support areas as engineering. The Mission also committed to projects or timelines for delivery that were largely impossible to meet given the physical conditions on the ground.

59. Remoteness, harsh terrain, extreme climate and the virtual absence of infrastructure and appropriate support structures should be taken fully into account in the planning and management of a mission, especially during its start-up phase.

D. Sustainability of the Détachement intégré de sécurité

60. DIS has been an experiment testing the ability of the United Nations to design and build a sustainable national security structure in accordance with international norms and standards in close cooperation with a host Government. The

Government's command and control over DIS posed a unique challenge. Originally envisaged as purely a community police force, the DIS concept evolved to incorporate more robust tasks (particularly the provision of security escorts), owing in part to operational necessities, Chadian preferences and the slow deployment of the military component. Furthermore, as outlined above, circumstances led the Mission to invest heavily in DIS and pay heed to demands by the Government for a high level of support.

61. While DIS is viable from an operational perspective, its sustainability following the departure of MINURCAT warrants considerable and continued attention. There has been widespread concern over the readiness of the unit to fully assume its responsibility on 1 January 2011, even with some continuing international support.

62. One of the lessons to be drawn from the DIS experience thus far is that sustainability requirements and plans for such a force should be prepared from the first stage of conception and the principle stringently adhered to throughout development.

E. Communication and the management of expectations

63. MINURCAT suffered from the lack of a communications strategy and was therefore unable to properly manage the expectations of the Government and to some extent humanitarian actors. An effective communication strategy should have been central to enhancing confidence and reducing misunderstandings as to the Mission's role and purpose in Chad and the north-eastern area of the Central African Republic. Instead, the mandate was not clearly understood, and the Government desired and expected support from the Mission for economic recovery and development in the eastern part of Chad, which was clearly outside the remit of the Mission.

64. It is evident that in the case of MINURCAT, the absence of a communications strategy impaired the Mission's ability to narrow the gap between expectations and reality. The main lesson learned is that such a strategy must be developed at the initial stage of a mission's deployment.

F. Achievements

65. Notwithstanding the comments set out above, during the study there was near unanimity among the interviewees on the following observations:

(a) In contrast with the tenuous consent by the Government for the military component, authorities accepted the civilian component of the Mission, and the extension of its mandate with solely that component was suggested as a possible option. Many interviewees expressed their appreciation for the positive impact of the civilian activities of the Mission. The Mission is also leaving behind a pool of skilled and trained national professionals whose experience with MINURCAT should benefit the development of the country;

(b) The deployment and conduct of operations in difficult, remote and landlocked areas such as eastern Chad and the north-eastern area of the Central African Republic is itself an achievement. The areas are vast, the terrain is harsh

and the climate is mostly unforgiving. Infrastructure is virtually nonexistent outside of the main cities and supply lines are extremely long. Notwithstanding the severe environmental and operational challenges, the MINURCAT force and DIS have managed to provide a measure of security for refugees, internally displaced persons and humanitarian actors. Local populations and beneficiaries of humanitarian aid generally expressed a positive view of DIS. Interviews highlighted the fact that the MINURCAT force built the trust of the population, especially women, in "uniformed men".

XI. Observations and recommendations

66. In conformity with the spirit and the letter of resolution 1923 (2010), the drawdown of the MINURCAT staff and assets is significantly advanced. The closure and handover of camps in its areas of operations have commenced in earnest. In this regard, I wish to commend the Governments of both Chad and the Central African Republic for the cooperation they have thus far extended to facilitate the process. I trust that the Government of Chad will continue to extend its full support for the orderly dismantling of the remaining camps in the country from now until the end of the liquidation.

67. With regard to the Central African Republic, I am concerned by the limited capacity of the security forces in Birao to fend off potential attacks on their positions now that MINURCAT has departed, as borne out by the recent attack by an armed opposition group, which resulted in the withdrawal of national security forces from Birao. I therefore again urge bilateral partners to respond positively to the request by the Government of the Central African Republic for assistance.

68. As outlined in the present report, the overall environment for the protection of civilians in eastern Chad continued to improve, particularly with regard to the physical aspects of protection. Fears that widespread criminal activities and insecurity would resume immediately after the rainy season have so far proven to be unfounded. The Government of Chad has assumed full responsibility for the security of civilians and humanitarian workers and has demonstrated over the past months its commitment to continue. The general perception is that eastern Chad is a more secure environment than it was in 2007. How much of this improvement is attributable to the deployment of MINURCAT and how much to the action of the Government and to the evolving local and subregional political and security dynamics is hard to evaluate at this stage.

69. The challenges are, nevertheless, immense. More than half a million refugees and internally displaced persons remain in need of humanitarian assistance and protection. Although internally displaced persons increasingly express interest in returning to their areas of origin or opt for other durable solutions, residual insecurity, the weakness of local governance structures and the absence of the most basic services discourage large-scale and enduring movements. The plight of the refugees will remain unresolved as long as instability and strife in their places of origin are not fully addressed.

70. This already fragile subregion is about to embark on multiple and nearly simultaneous electoral processes in early 2011. It is important that, following the withdrawal of MINURCAT, eastern Chad and the north-eastern area of the Central

African Republic remain on the international agenda and that the Governments receive appropriate support and attention from international partners.

71. In this regard, the efforts of the United Nations country team in Chad to reinforce its planning, advisory and coordination capacity are encouraging. This should provide it with a surge capacity to support the Government in preserving the momentum in eastern Chad achieved in recent years, to which MINURCAT has contributed.

72. In addition to the immediate need for donors to provide the resources necessary to meet the humanitarian needs of refugees and internally displaced persons in the east, there is equally a need for their support for programmes promoting durable solutions for them. For the foreseeable future, DIS will have a critical role to perform. I therefore encourage Member States to ensure that the necessary donor funds are made available to meet the programmed budgetary requirements for 2011.

73. MINURCAT has been an unusual and unique United Nations peacekeeping operation in that it was devoted solely to contributing to the protection of civilians, without an explicit political mandate. It has gone through the stages of planning, deployment and withdrawal in the short span of less than four years, enduring adversities in each. It is my earnest hope that the few lessons outlined in the present report will be of assistance to the Security Council when it considers the evolution of peacekeeping as a whole and contemplates mandates for peacekeeping operations providing for the protection of civilians.

74. Notwithstanding the difficulties faced, the Mission successfully contributed to enhancing security in eastern Chad, particularly among the most vulnerable segment of the population. The Mission's substantive programmes have left their mark in eastern Chad. DIS, despite some shortcomings, is a relatively successful experiment of a nationally owned and internationally supported security structure for the protection of civilians. Recent steps taken by the Government of Chad and the United Nations country team, with the support of MINURCAT, have laid a good foundation for its consolidation and sustainability. The key to the durability of DIS ultimately rests with the Government, which has given firm assurances in this regard.

75. The MINURCAT military component worked hard to reach a critical mass by the end of 2009. Through its security escorts, patrols and visible presence, as well as civilian outreach programmes, it has made undeniable contributions to the security of humanitarian space and the protection of civilians. This credit must also go to the troop-contributing countries and to the leadership of the force.

76. Finally, I would like to thank my Special Representative, Youssef Mahmoud, in assuming the leadership of the Mission during a period of uncertainty over its future, which he did most ably, and for seeing it through the delicate period of consolidation and withdrawal. I also wish to extend my deep appreciation to the men and women of MINURCAT, national and international, civilian and uniformed, for their unwavering commitment to duty in the service of the United Nations.

United Nations

A/ES-10/506–S/2010/612

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
3 December 2010

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Identical letters dated 2 December 2010 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

It is with grave concern that I must draw your attention to the continuation and intensification of Israel's illegal, massive colonial settlement campaign in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.

In that connection, we wish to place on record our total condemnation of the approval by Israel, the occupying Power, of the construction of 625 new settlement units in the illegal Israeli settlement of "Pisgat Ze'ev" in Occupied East Jerusalem as announced on 1 December 2010. The latest unilateral, illegal measure comes on the heels of yet another unlawful announcement by the occupying Power, on 29 November 2010, to build 130 new settlement units in the illegal Israeli settlement of "Gilo", also in occupied East Jerusalem, on land confiscated from the Palestinian villages of Beit Jala, Shu'fat and Beit Safafa. As has been the case over the past years and months, the Government of Israel has continued to choose settlements over peace, and colonization over ending its occupation. These latest plans and announcements further confirm Israel's rejection of its legal obligations under international law, United Nations resolutions and the Quartet road map, as well as its rejection of the two-State solution for peace on the basis of the pre-1967 borders.

At the same time, Israel, the occupying Power, has continued to carry out additional actions that are obviously aimed at changing the status of Occupied East Jerusalem and at entrenching its illegitimate annexation of the city. In that regard, the first phase of the so-called Jerusalem light rail, which was initiated in 2005, is currently under construction. The route of the first instalment of the train line will connect the illegal Israeli settlements of "Neve Ya'aqov" and "Pisgat Ze'ev", via the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Shu'fat, to the West Jerusalem city centre and neighbourhoods. The so-called Jerusalem light rail will constitute additional infrastructure serving the illegal settlement network, which is not only in violation of international law but will also present further obstacles to the freedom of

Please recycle

movement of the Palestinian population and detrimentally impact the fabric and presence of Palestinian life, including residence and livelihoods in the Old City. Moreover, such policies gravely undermine the prospects for the realization of the two-State solution since they deliberately and artificially sever East Jerusalem from the rest of the Palestinian Territory and destroy its contiguity and viability. We call on the international community to condemn this illegal action and to call on the occupying Power to halt all construction in this regard.

It cannot be disregarded that this latest provocation comes at a critical stage during which all efforts are being exerted internationally and regionally, including by the United States of America, the Quartet and the League of Arab States, to overcome the deadlock and resume serious and credible peace talks between the two sides. In fact, the Palestinian leadership had hoped to hear confirmation during the week that Israel, the occupying Power, would finally comply with its legal obligations and respect the repeated calls and appeals from around the world to cease all such illegal activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. However, the complete opposite has occurred. With these recent declarations along with the ongoing construction throughout all parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, especially in and around East Jerusalem, the international community, including the Palestinian side, has received a clear, blunt answer from Israel in deed rather than word. Its actions reveal its insistence to continue pursuit of this illegitimate campaign at the expense of regional and international peace, with all of the negative ramifications in this regard.

The ongoing threats to the prospects for peace are repeatedly manifested in statements made in that connection by the Government of Israel and its officials. For example, following the most recent approval of illegal settlement expansion in Occupied East Jerusalem, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, himself a settler, repeated his firm opposition to halting illegal settlement construction and stated: "I think, like many others, that there will not be another freeze. We must erase the word 'freeze' from our vocabulary." Such a statement must be firmly confronted and rejected by the international community, in line with the position of principle that has been taken in this regard, as reflected in numerous United Nations resolutions and in line with the Quartet road map call for a freeze of all settlement activities, including natural growth.

We are at an extremely fragile juncture, in which the potential for resuming a credible peace is quickly fleeting. We must not allow the tremendous efforts that have been exerted internationally and regionally, including by the United States, the Quartet, the League of Arab States and all other concerned members of the international community, as well as by the Palestinian side under the leadership of President Mahmoud Abbas, to be in vain and to be arrogantly ignored by the occupying Power.

We therefore reiterate our call upon the Security Council to shoulder its responsibilities and take a clear and strong position in rejection of Israel's illegal settlement activities as it has done in the past, including via its adoption of numerous resolutions on this issue. There is consensus in the international community, including among the members of the Security Council, on the illegality of Israeli settlement activity, the danger it poses to the maintenance of international peace and security and the urgency of an immediate and full halt. The time has come for serious action to be taken by the Security Council in order to reassert its

rightful role to help salvage any chance that remains to resume peace talks and to bring Israel into compliance with its legal obligations as an occupying Power as well as a Member State of the United Nations.

In addition to the above, we must also draw your attention to the continuing condemnable use of excessive, lethal force by Israel, the occupying Power, against Palestinian civilians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In that connection, in the early hours of 2 December 2010, Israeli occupying forces killed two Palestinians in the besieged Gaza Strip. This is yet another glaring example that the occupying Power has never, despite any and all peace efforts, ceased its crimes and merciless human rights violations against the Palestinian people. We call on the international community to condemn these latest killings and compel Israel to halt its illegal, violent and provocative actions that threaten to further escalate tensions and destabilize the fragile situation on the ground, and to completely end all efforts to resume peace efforts.

The present letter is in follow-up to our previous 378 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 10 November 2010 (A/ES-10/505-S/2010/578) constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

United Nations A/65/600–S/2010/613

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
7 December 2010

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-fifth session
Agenda item 34
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Identical letters dated 3 December 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia concerning the ongoing acts of vandalism towards Georgian cultural and religious monuments in the occupied territory of Abkhazia, Georgia (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34.

(*Signed*) Alexander **Lomaia**
Permanent Representative

10-67929 (E) 131210

Please recycle

A/65/600
S/2010/613

Annex to the letter dated 3 December 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia over the ongoing acts of vandalism towards Georgian cultural and religious monuments in the occupied territory of Abkhazia, Georgia

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia expresses its grave concern over the ongoing acts of vandalism towards Georgian cultural and religious monuments in the occupied territories of Abkhazia, Georgia, and Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, Georgia.

Notably, one of the most precious monuments of Georgian cultural heritage, the eleventh century Ilori St. George Church, located in Abkhazia, Georgia, has completely lost its authenticity after the so-called rehabilitation works. Such works have resulted in the obliteration of all the characteristic features of the traditional Georgian architecture, reshaping it after the Russian architectural model. This has been done by adding a so-called "onion shaped" dome to the building, a typical Russian architectural detail. The front walls, including the eastern side of the church, which featured five Georgian lapidary inscriptions, have been painted in white, lined with red colour arches, as well as other architectural profiles, alien to Georgian architecture.

In addition, the so-called rehabilitation works are also under way for the New-Athos Monastery. Furthermore, according to the so-called State Information Agency of the proxy regime in Abkhazia, it is planned to announce a tender for restoration works aimed at rehabilitating Orthodox Churches on the territory of Abkhazia. Plans are being made to coordinate the activities of the Russian funds, public sector and individuals who might be involved in such activities. Illegal agreements, such as the one dated 16 October 2010, signed between the so-called Ministry of Culture of the "Republic of Abkhazia" and the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation, in the field of preservation, examination, popularization and state protection of historical and cultural monuments, and a similar document dated 25 October 2010, signed between Russia and the proxy regime of the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, Georgia, serve as the bases for such works.

However, taking into consideration the true intentions of the proxy regimes and their mentors towards the historic monuments on Georgian occupied territories, as exemplified by the case described above, we have grounded suspicion that under the guise of safeguarding the cultural monuments, we will ultimately witness a dramatic and deliberate destruction of Georgian cultural heritage on the occupied territories. The aforesaid is a merciless continuation of the policy of ethnic cleansing of Georgians aimed at eradicating the signs of Georgian presence on the occupied territories.

It should be noted that, with these acts, Russia is violating international law, including the obligations assumed under International Humanitarian Law, particularly the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict — 1954, which condemns the State parties for damaging and

destroying historic and cultural heritage, while in the case of occupation obliges State parties to the Convention to take all appropriate measures to conduct their activities in such a manner as to protect cultural heritage.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia expresses its deep concern over the actions of the proxy regimes and the Russian Federation and calls upon the international community, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and other international organizations to employ all the instruments at their disposal to halt the deliberate destruction of Georgian cultural and historical heritage.

Tbilisi, 22 November 2010

United Nations S/2010/614

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 December 2010

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa

I. Introduction

1. In its letter dated 21 December 2007 (S/2007/754), the Security Council agreed to extend the mandate of the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) until 31 December 2010, and requested me to report on the implementation of the revised mandate of UNOWA every six months. The present report covers the period from 1 July to 31 December 2010. It focuses on national, cross-cutting and cross-border developments in West Africa and activities undertaken by UNOWA in preventative diplomacy, raising awareness on emerging threats and challenges, and on efforts aimed at promoting consultations and synergies at the subregional level and liaison with and assistance to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union in the promotion of peace and stability.

2. While progress made in addressing these issues is encouraging, it needs to be further consolidated to make a real impact on the lives of the people in the subregion. As I underlined in my last report on UNOWA (S/2010/324), West Africa remains vulnerable to a range of internal and external destabilizing factors. Internal challenges include those related to governance and the rule of law, transparency and accountability, flawed elections, continuing difficulties with concepts like power-sharing, security sector reform, gender equity, human rights and impunity. External factors of instability that continue to affect West Africa are more regional and cross-border in nature. They include terrorist activities and transnational organized crime, notably drug trafficking.

II. Country-specific political developments and UNOWA good offices

3. Some parts of West Africa continue to experience political instability related to the transition from military rule or civil tensions to more open democratic regimes and constitutional order. These include notably the situations in Guinea and Niger, and post-election tensions witnessed in Mauritania and Togo. These country-specific developments were the focus of much of the activities of the UNOWA good offices in the period under review.

10-66838 (E) 141210

Please recycle

A. Guinea

[illegible] on the history of the country, Guinea organized a democratic multiparty presidential election on 27 June 2010. The conduct of the poll was peaceful and credible. Out of 24 candidates who contested the election, two leading candidates emerged: Mr. Cellou Dalein Diallo of the Union des Forces Democratiques de Guinee (UFDG), and Mr. Alpha Conde of the Rassemblement du Peuple de Guinee (RPG), claiming 43.69 per cent and 18.25 per cent of votes, respectively. The run-off, initially scheduled to take place on 18 July 2010, was repeatedly postponed as a result of a lack of consensus among the major stakeholders, especially between the two leading candidates, on the timing and the modalities for conducting the second round on the one hand, and on technical and logistical constraints on the other. During the period of the election, a senior mediation adviser and the Deputy Director of the Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs were deployed in Guinea to provide United Nations support to regional mediation efforts in collaboration with the United Nations Resident Coordinator.

5. On 12 August, my Special Representative for West Africa met with Cellou Dalein Diallo in Dakar to exchange views on the impact of the postponement of the date for the run-off presidential poll. An ECOWAS/African Union/United Nations mission visited Guinea from 19 to 20 August 2010 and reviewed progress made towards holding the run-off, which was rescheduled for 19 September. The challenge of how to address the shortcomings observed during the first round, in order to avert potential difficulties during the run-off, was addressed by the joint mission.

6. On 3 September, the two candidates for the run-off, Cellou Dalein Diallo and Alpha Condé, signed a memorandum of understanding in Ouagadougou under the aegis of President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, the ECOWAS mediator for Guinea, in which they undertook to work for free, transparent and democratic elections, and to preserve social cohesion and national unity. From 2 to 3 September 2010, the International Contact Group for Guinea reviewed with national stakeholders progress made and outstanding challenges in the run-off preparatory process, including on the critical issue of cooperation between the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) and the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Political Affairs. On 4 September, an African Union/United Nations/ECOWAS delegation briefed President Blaise Compaoré in Ouagadougou on developments in Guinea and on the conclusions of the meeting of the International Contact Group for Guinea, stressing the crucial role that the ECOWAS Mediator could play in ensuring a credible and peaceful transition in Guinea.

7. On 17 September, an ECOWAS extraordinary summit held in Abuja on Guinea-Bissau, which my Special Representative attended, issued a communiqué on Guinea, calling for the setting, without further delay of a date for the run-off of the presidential election. The communiqué also called on the two candidates to abide by the memorandum of understanding that they had signed in Ouagadougou on 3 September under the auspices of the ECOWAS Mediator.

8. Following the exacerbation of tensions related to disagreements over the credibility and the leadership of CENI, UNOWA facilitated another ECOWAS/ African Union/United Nations mission to Conakry from 18 to 20 September to help

Guineans keep the transition process on course. The delegation was able to secure a further commitment from the two candidates that they would show restraint and call for calm among their respective supporters, as well as a pledge to establish regular channels of communication with one another. Consistent with the advice of the ECOWAS/African Union/United Nations delegation, the interim President of Guinea, General Sékouba Konaté, insisted that both the candidates and the Electoral Commission agree on a date for the run-off. Subsequently, the joint delegation travelled to Ouagadougou, where they again provided an update to President Compaoré on 21 September and underscored the need for the Mediator to encourage General Konaté to exercise greater authority over the transition process. During that time, I spoke to a number of regional and foreign leaders, including President Goodluck Jonathan in his capacity as the Chair of ECOWAS, to help move the process forward. I also met with delegations from Guinea, Nigeria and France in New York on the margins of the General Assembly. I raised the issue of Guinea and the need to ensure the holding of credible, peaceful and timely elections.

9. Following these intensive consultations, on 2 October, General Konaté announced the establishment of a follow-up commission to support CENI in the organization of the long-awaited election. Although this decision was welcomed by all stakeholders, the electoral process continued to face challenges related to the calendar and the CENI leadership, escalating the potential for violence and insecurity.

10. On 5 October, General Konaté issued a decree fixing 24 October as the new date for the run-off. That date could not be met owing to a number of issues, including divergent views among the candidates on the CENI leadership. As the differences persisted, General Konaté appointed the adviser to CENI of the Organization of la Francophonie, retired General Siaka Toumani Sangaré of Mali, as the new Chair of CENI. The appointment was welcomed by the two candidates.

11. On 13 October my Special Representative travelled again to Conakry, where he discussed the potential for election-related violence with stakeholders in the Guinean capital, including with interim President Konaté and with Prime Minister Doré. His interlocutors confirmed the determination of the Government to maintain law and order during and after the election. They further called for additional support by the international community to strengthen the authority of the interim Government, including by urging the international community to threaten to impose targeted sanctions against spoilers. The two candidates assured my Special Representative of their commitment to peaceful elections, and their acceptance of the principle of an inclusive Government of national unity and the maintenance of open channels of dialogue and communication.

12. On 26 October, after consultations with all stakeholders, the new Chair of CENI proposed 31 October 2010 as the new date for the presidential run-off poll. Upon consideration, General Konaté issued a decree setting 7 November 2010 as the date for the run-off. Following that announcement, from 3 to 8 November, my Special Representative undertook a mission to Conakry to support the ongoing efforts to create a conducive environment for the run-off presidential election. Subsequently, the poll took place as scheduled on 7 November. During the ballot-counting process, Mr. Diallo's camp had already begun challenging the credibility of the process, alleging fraud in some constituencies. Although the election was held in a peaceful and orderly manner, tensions remained high over the release of the

provisional results by CENI, which were contested by Mr. Diallo. The release of the provisional results was followed by days of protests, mainly by supporters of Mr. Diallo, resulting in a number of deaths, injuries and the destruction of property, amid allegations of the excessive use of force by members of the armed forces. The World Health Organization confirmed that 10 people died and 302 others were injured in the violence. Calm returned to Guinea after the Government declared a state of emergency on 17 November.

13. From 11 to 16 November, my Special Representative returned to Conakry in order to help manage post-election tensions. He remained in constant touch with all stakeholders, especially the two candidates, and urged them to preserve peace, accept the election results and resort to legal means for their claims. My Special Representative, together with other members of the International Contact Group for Guinea, met Cellou Dalein Diallo to express concerns about Mr. Diallo's statement that he would not accept the provisional results until his claims were duly processed by CENI. During a subsequent meeting with the Chair of CENI, General Sangaré, the latter assured Mr. Diallo that all claims had already been examined and that the results correctly reflected the votes cast.

14. On 16 November, CENI announced the full provisional results as follows: candidate Alpha Condé won the election with 52.52 per cent of the votes cast as against 47.48 per cent for Cellou Dalein Diallo. UFDG, led by Mr. Diallo, rejected the results, and announced its decision to challenge the results at the Supreme Court. My Special Representative met the same day with the candidate and encouraged him to continue to preserve national cohesion and peace by appealing to his supporters to exercise restraint. He also renewed his earlier appeal to Mr. Diallo to resort to legal means in pursuing his objections to the provisional results announced on that occasion.

15. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General also met with interim President General Konaté in the presence of his military commanders. The main concern he raised at the meeting was the reported use of excessive force by the security forces during street protests. For his part, the interim President requested my Special Representative to assist in promoting dialogue between the two candidates to ensure that they would not renege on their previous commitment that whoever emerged as the winner in the second round would work towards the formation of a government of national unity. The Minister in Charge of Security assured my Special Representative that the police and defence forces had purportedly been instructed not to use excessive force. On 17 November, the interim authorities decreed a country-wide state of emergency to prevent further violence, until the publication of the final results, on 2 December. From 15 November until 2 December, my Personal Envoy, other United Nations senior officials and I worked, in collaboration with national, regional and international actors, in support of restoring calm and calling on all Guineans to accept the results of the election and to resolve any differences through legal means. On 3 December, the Supreme Court of Guinea declared Mr. Alpha Condé the winner of the presidential election. My Special Representative, who had arrived in Conakry before the proclamation of the final results by the Supreme Court, called President-elect Alpha Condé to congratulate him. He also met with Prime Minister Jean Marie Doré, alongside the African Union special envoy, and had in-depth discussions on actions to be taken in the next few days to maintain calm. They encouraged Prime Minister Doré to pay a visit to Cellou Dalein Diallo. At the invitation of Mr. Diallo, the African

Union/United Nations delegation attended a public gathering, during which Mr. Diallo declared that he accepted the Supreme Court ruling.

B. Niger

16. During the reporting period, progress was witnessed in the transition process in Niger. Following consultations among national stakeholders, including the ruling military-led Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSRD), the Government, CENI and the Constitutional Court, a consensual electoral timetable for the transition was adopted on 17 September. On 1 October, Head of State, Lieutenant-General Salou Djibo signed a decree on the referendum on the new Constitution. The referendum took place peacefully on 31 October and a new Constitution was adopted with 90.19 per cent of votes and a voter turnout of 52.65 per cent. Presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled for 31 January 2011, with a possible run-off on 12 March. It is envisaged that the final results of the presidential election will be released on 1 April, and the inauguration of the newly elected president will take place on 6 April.

17. Throughout the reporting period, my Special Representative, in close coordination with ECOWAS and the African Union, engaged with national stakeholders to ensure a smooth and effective return to constitutional order. On 12 June, a senior mediation adviser was deployed to Niger to provide United Nations support to regional mediation efforts. On 13 September, my Special Representative held discussions with national stakeholders and international partners in Niamey, including with the Head of State, Lieutenant-General Salou Djibo, the Prime Minister, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to review the progress made in the political transition and in the humanitarian situation in the country. During the visit, my Special Representative acknowledged the improvement in the humanitarian situation as a result of the effective response by the international community and the cooperation extended to humanitarian agencies by the Government, which created a conducive environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to communities in need in Niger. He was also able to confirm the determination of the Head of State to remain focused on the transition and to fulfil his commitment to hand over power to an elected President as planned, in spite of dissension among junta members. Lieutenant-General Salou Djibo confirmed this message on the margins of the general debate of the General Assembly. United Nations support for the transition process was offered at the highest level.

18. In early October, Lieutenant-General Salou Djibo made significant moves to restructure CSRD, and to that end reshuffled key positions in the military and security apparatus. High-ranking security officials were arrested in the subsequent days amid allegations of plotting a coup against the interim President. On 21 October, the CSRD Spokesman, Colonel Goukoye Abdoulkarim, confirmed the arrest of four senior army officers and CSRD members.

19. As a result of these worrying developments, my Special Representative and the President of the ECOWAS Commission undertook a joint mission to Niamey on 15 October to seek clarification from the Head of State and to reiterate the support of the international community for the regime's transition programme. Although Lieutenant-General Djibo acknowledged that there was disagreement among junta

members on the principle and duration of the transition, he assured the delegation that such disagreements would not affect the transition. He indicated that preventive measures had been taken to ensure security and stability, noting that further appropriate decisions would be made depending on the outcome of ongoing investigations. He also called upon the international community to provide timely financial support to the electoral process to avert delay in the electoral schedule.

20. In spite of the progress in the transition process, it is important to remain vigilant, especially given the restiveness in the military and as the transition process enters its most delicate phase of legislative and presidential elections.

C. Togo

21. UNOWA continued to be engaged with developments in Togo, where the situation in the country was dominated during the reporting period by two trends: rapprochement between the Government and the main opposition party, the Union des Forces pour le Changement (UFC), as manifested by the inclusion of UFC members in an enlarged Government formed in May 2010. That move was expected to strengthen the prospects for national reconciliation and peace. On the other hand, an internal leadership struggle within UFC intensified, following the formation of the new Government, which remains a source of concern.

22. UFC President Gilchrist Olympio opted for his party joining the new Government in order to foster national reconciliation, while UFC Secretary-General and former presidential candidate Jean-Pierre Fabre continued to mobilize segments of the party and the population against the Government. For a few months thereafter both men claimed leadership of UFC, with each separately convening the party's congress. Jean-Pierre Fabre finally broke away from UFC to form a new political party, Alliance Nationale pour le Changement (ANC).

23. Throughout the period under review, opposition parties under the umbrella coalition Front Républicain pour l'Alternance et le Changement (FRAC) continued to protest against the re-election of President Faure Gnassingbé.

24. Meanwhile, the activities of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, established by the Ouagadougou Global Political Agreement of 2006 to probe into political violence perpetrated in Togo between 1958 and 2005, also resumed, after having been suspended because of the presidential election.

D. Mauritania

25. The political situation in Mauritania also received the attention of UNOWA, as efforts continued by national stakeholders to achieve a consensus on the conditions and the modalities for national dialogue and reconciliation. In June and July 2010, a series of meetings between President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz and opposition figures raised expectations for a productive dialogue. However, concrete outcomes from that initiative are yet to materialize.

26. During a national address on 4 August to mark his first year in office, the President asserted that his administration had been successful in addressing both issues of good governance and the prevailing socio-economic challenges. He further

stated that there was no political crisis in the country that would justify a dialogue with the opposition, even though he was not opposed to such a dialogue in principle.

27. On 6 August, the Coordination of Democratic Opposition (COD) accused the Government of Mauritania of undermining the Dakar Framework Agreement signed on 4 June 2009 by the three main political groups in Mauritania. Opposition leaders accused President Ould Abdel Aziz of reneging on his previous commitments to national political dialogue.

28. Against that backdrop and in order to encourage national dialogue, my Special Representative travelled to Nouakchott again on 1 September, to meet with national stakeholders, including President Ould Abdel Aziz, the Speaker of the National Assembly, Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, and the opposition. In addition to the national dialogue process, they also discussed insecurity and terrorism in the Sahel, and the prospects for regional cooperation on these issues.

29. These discussions confirmed that there remains lingering residual mistrust between the Government and the opposition, and that there was still no consensus on the terms of reference envisaged for national dialogue. The opposition continues to insist on the need to fully implement the Dakar Agreement, while the Government wants no reference to that agreement. It is worth noting that the opposition party, headed by Ahmed Ould Daddah of Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques (RFD), announced on 12 September its decision to recognize the validity of the outcome of the August 2009 presidential election and the tenure of Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz as the President of Mauritania.

III. Developments, trends and UNOWA activities in cross-border and cross-cutting issues

30. During the reporting period, UNOWA, in coordination with United Nations entities in West Africa and the wider international community, continued to support West African Governments, peoples and subregional organizations in their efforts to address main cross-border and cross-cutting challenges affecting the subregion.

A. Economic, social and humanitarian issues

31. In the socio-economic and humanitarian spheres, the second half of 2010 was challenging for West African countries. The humanitarian situation in the region was characterized by persistent food crises in the Sahel, floods and outbreaks of diseases, especially cholera and meningitis. Persistent and complex economic and social challenges also continued to impact negatively on West Africa, including low progress in achieving the Millennium Development Goals in a number of countries. Trends in the realm of the Millennium Development Goals remained unchanged, reflecting extreme poverty, high levels of unemployment, notably among the youth, and a widening gap between the rich and the poor. These developments carried with them a high potential for civil unrest and violence, especially in a subregion where inflationary rates remain high, and the dividends of economic growth are yet to be fairly shared among the diverse segments of the population of the subregion.

32. The food crisis in West Africa affects millions of people and remains a pressing issue. Niger was the most affected, with a global acute malnutrition rate of

16.7 per cent; 47 per cent of the population experienced food insecurity and malnutrition. The flooding in 2010 in the subregion is also believed to be the worst in decades. The floods exacerbated an already precarious food security and nutritional situation in the most vulnerable parts of the subregion. Since June, floods have affected 1.7 million people and caused 335 deaths across the subregion. Benin has suffered the most, with an estimated 680,000 people being affected, including over 150,000 people temporarily displaced. The cholera outbreak that began in June in the subregion was also devastating in its impact. Over 40,000 cases and over 1,600 deaths were reported. In addition, from January to the end of September 2010, eight West African countries in the meningitis belt reported a total of 17,252 suspected cases of meningitis with over 1,700 deaths.

33. The response of the international community to this grave situation was most encouraging and multifaceted. It involved Governments, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations. As at 12 November 2010, the consolidated appeals process for West Africa had raised $323 million, with an additional $50 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund, covering priority projects in nine West African countries, for a total of about 48 per cent of the required $774 million. These contributions enabled aid actors to implement food, agriculture, farming, water and income-generating projects. In Niger, the massive humanitarian intervention succeeded in averting the worst effects of a food and nutrition crisis that would otherwise have put over 1 million people in serious jeopardy. Considering the profound food and nutrition crisis in Niger, the country will issue its own consolidated appeals process next year, while the West African consolidated appeals process will continue to cover the rest of the humanitarian needs in the subregion.

34. From a preventive standpoint, the regional office of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in partnership with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, will actively engage with national disaster management agencies and ECOWAS to strengthen the response preparedness of Member States and maximize the use of regional resources and expertise during disasters. Overall, prospects for agricultural production in most West African countries look good, largely as a result of an impressive 2010-2011 rainy season. According to Comité permanent inter-États de lutte contre la sécheresse, the 2010 harvest is likely to be one of the best in recent years. Some areas, however, may experience only average production levels, especially where rain deficits have been recorded. Similarly, countries that have suffered or are still suffering from flooding and extended rains are likely to experience poor harvests.

35. From 14 to 16 October, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valérie Amos, undertook a visit to Niger, where she met representatives of the Government, the humanitarian community and donors. During her visit, she underscored the need to learn the appropriate lessons from the continuing humanitarian crises in the subregion and, in particular to build and strengthen the capacities of countries in the Sahel to prevent them from relapsing into recurrent humanitarian catastrophes and conflict.

B. Human rights and gender issues

36. During the period under review, West African countries showed keen interest to undertake specific measures to implement the provisions contained in Security Council resolutions related to women and peace and security, in particular Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008). The Gambia, Senegal and Nigeria commenced the process of developing national action plans on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), while Benin, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania and Togo are on course to follow suit. The protection and promotion of human rights during electoral processes continued to be a major challenge. There is an inadequate application of a human rights-based approach in a number of key areas, such as elections, development programmes, security sector reform, combating and mitigating the negative impact of trafficking in persons and drugs, and climate change.

37. UNOWA continued to monitor the human rights situation in the subregion with emphasis on countries involved in electoral processes. There was a determined effort to mainstream human rights and gender issues in policies of the countries with which the mission engaged. UNOWA and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) completed a joint study on the trafficking in persons in West Africa, which resulted in the development of guidelines to promote the adoption of domestic legislation in compliance with international and regional human rights norms and standards. UNOWA also documented best practices and lessons learned in the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008) in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

38. At another level, UNOWA continued to work closely with ECOWAS in support of the activities of the latter's Working Group on Women, Peace and Security in West Africa. UNOWA also convened a regional forum on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008) in Dakar, from 15 to 17 September, in close collaboration with the African Union, ECOWAS, the Mano River Union, the United Nations Population Fund, the United Nations Development Fund for Women and the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (now part of UN Women), OHCHR, the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations Children's Fund. On 17 September, the Forum adopted a five-year ECOWAS plan of action (2010-2015) for the effective implementation of Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008) and the Dakar Declaration, in which all West African States renewed their commitment to the implementation of these resolutions. The Forum was attended by 146 participants, including the Vice-President of the Republic of the Gambia and a significant number of West African ministers in charge of gender and women's empowerment, representatives of the African Union, United Nations entities and civil society organizations. My Special Representative also attended the Global Open Day on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), held in New York on 21 October, where he presented the outcome of the Dakar regional forum.

39. In the context of climate change, especially as it related to the displacement of populations, land and water disputes, the destruction of life and property, UNOWA initiated a study on various dimensions of climate change, especially on its impact on peace and security in West Africa. That study, which is expected to be completed in early 2011, will facilitate the formulation of policy recommendations for

advocacy and preventive diplomacy on the threats to peace and security in West Africa linked to climate change.

40. From 19 to 21 October, UNOWA participated in the fifth biannual meeting of heads of human rights field presences in West Africa, organized by OHCHR in Monrovia. The meeting reviewed the road map adopted during the fourth biannual meeting in Niamey, focusing in particular on activities organized jointly by UNOWA and OHCHR in the area of human rights and gender. It further proposed joint activities for the first semester of 2011, including the convening of a regional conference on impunity, peace and security in West Africa. From 7 to 12 November, UNOWA also jointly organized four seminars on the role of women in governance; the situation of human rights in West Africa; the rights of ethnic minorities and indigenous populations; and socio-economic and cultural rights, in Banjul, with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and OHCHR, as part of a series of events marking the thirtieth anniversary of the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights.

C. Drug trafficking and cross-border organized crime

41. According to latest figures available from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), as well as statistics issued by international police organizations (INTERPOL and Europol), the quantities of illicit drugs seized in Europe coming from or through West Africa continued to decline during the reporting period.

42. As highlighted in my previous reports, this seems to be the result of the enhanced sophistication of drug cartels' modus operandi, rather than an actual decline in drug trafficking. During the reporting period, massive quantities of illicit drugs were seized on West African soil, including the largest single cocaine seizure in the region on land (2.14 tons), in the Gambia in June 2010, and the 0.45 ton of cocaine seized at the Lagos seaport, in Nigeria in July. Though these seizures were insufficient to draw reliable analysis of the patterns and trends, they revealed nevertheless that drug cartels continued to target West African States, where illegal activities are facilitated by fragile institutions and weak governance structures. While it is believed that drug trafficking is still mainly organized by Latin American crime syndicates and individuals, it has been observed that West African nationals are increasingly becoming involved in the trafficking enterprise, with strong connections to other criminal activities such as money-laundering.

43. The emergence of the manufacturing of amphetamine-type stimulants and their trafficking from and through West Africa is a recent and increasingly important trend that indicates that the infrastructure established by transnational cocaine and heroin traffickers is readily adaptable. Further to the discovery, in July 2009 in Guinea, of chemicals and large-scale equipment used in the illicit manufacture of ecstasy, the United States indicted members of an international cocaine trafficking ring for, inter alia, attempting to establish large-scale crystal methamphetamine-manufacturing laboratories in Liberia. Furthermore, 3 tons of chemical precursors for the production of ecstasy destined for Benin and Guinea (Conakry) were seized in Côte d'Ivoire in June 2010.

44. Recent UNODC rapid situation assessments on illicit drugs reveal that consumption is on the rise in West Africa. This is a worrying side effect of the use

of some West African States as drug-trafficking transit routes. This negative impact on individual health and on society as a whole is aggravated by the low quality of resources left in the subregion as payment or induction. The trafficking in fake or counterfeit medicines poses another significant challenge and a serious public health threat. In addition to poor border controls, the absence of adequate counter-narcotic legal frameworks facilitates trafficking.

45. The security situation in the Sahel belt is another major concern. The abduction of seven foreigners in northern Niger in mid-September, for which a group linked to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb subsequently claimed responsibility, prompted a reinforcement of regional cooperation initiatives against terrorism and organized crime. That cooperation was evident during the meeting of the military chiefs of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger in Tamanrasset, Algeria, on 26 September, and in the subsequent decision, of 29 September, by the same countries, to establish in Algeria, a joint intelligence centre. In spite of these initiatives, however, West African Sahelian States continue to lack adequate means to address terrorist and criminal threats, in order to guarantee a safe environment for their populations from these criminal groups and cartels.

46. As part of the ongoing efforts to enhance the role of the United Nations in combating insecurity in the Sahel, my Special Representative attended the international conference entitled "Towards a Security and Development Partnership in the Sahel". The conference was organized by Observatoire Sahelo-Saharien de Géopolitique et de Stratégie, with the support of the European Union, and held on 25 and 26 November in Brussels. On the margins of that meeting, he had productive exchanges with representatives of governmental and non-governmental institutions on ways of strengthening the supportive role of UNOWA in addressing the challenge of insecurity in the Sahel.

47. UNOWA also increased its efforts to support the implementation of the ECOWAS regional action plan to address the growing threat of illicit drug trafficking, organized crime and drug abuse in West Africa. At an ECOWAS/UNOWA meeting on mutual cooperation held on 14 October in Abuja, my Special Representative and the President of the ECOWAS Commission agreed to further mobilize the West African leadership on the importance of addressing drug trafficking and strengthening their cooperation, especially in supporting the implementation of the regional action plan and the West African Coast Initiative.

48. On 17 November, my Special Representative undertook a visit to Vienna for discussions with the new Executive Director of UNODC, Yury Fedotov, to strengthen the UNOWA partnership and to reinforce coordination of international support to the ECOWAS regional action plan and the West African Coast Initiative. My Special Representative and the Executive Director agreed to co-chair the launch of the UNODC Regional Programme for West Africa for 2010-2014, planned for 16 December in New York.

49. Significant progress was also made in the implementation of the West African Coast Initiative in the four pilot countries: Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone, the memorandum of understanding setting up the Transnational and Organized Crime Unit was signed by the Government on 23 September, paving the way for the operationalization of this inter-agency national capacity. In Guinea-Bissau, the matter is being discussed by relevant Government departments. In Côte d'Ivoire, the Government indicated that it would

move ahead with establishing the Transnational and Organized Crime Unit. A three-tier steering and coordination mechanism has been finalized and is expected to be approved soon by all partners.

50. At a more technical level, UNOWA provided support to the ECOWAS experts meeting in Banjul, from 28 to 30 September. UNOWA was also represented at two training sessions aimed at promoting the ECOWAS regional action plan, and, in September, at the regional training centre on counter-narcotics in Grand-Bassam, Côte d'Ivoire. The mission also assisted UNODC through political interventions in specific country cases, such as in Guinea, to facilitate access to a technical international team for handling the chemical precursor stockpile discovered in 2009.

D. Security sector reform

51. UNOWA continued to provide ECOWAS with political and technical support in the latter's efforts to strengthen the regional political framework and plan of action on security sector governance. The draft policy document of that framework is being finalized by the ECOWAS institutions, before its presentation to ECOWAS member States. UNOWA also contributed to the process of the African Union's draft continental security sector reform policy framework, which was developed during a joint African Union/United Nations meeting held on 20 and 21 October in Accra at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre. Additionally, UNOWA support facilitated the building of synergies between the African Union and ECOWAS, on processes related to the regional action plan and the security sector governance. In order to operationalize the regional forum of security sector reform experts and practitioners, which was formed on 18 February in support of ECOWAS security sector reform efforts, UNOWA started developing a virtual platform of resources, with technical assistance from the Office of Information and Communications Technology of the Secretariat and the Security Sector Reform Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

52. As part of its security sector reform advocacy policy, UNOWA contributed to the organization of the international colloquium held on the theme "Defence and Security Forces at the Heart of Human Security", in Dakar from 8 to 11 November, initiated by the Senegalese Defence Chief of Staff and sponsored by the President of Senegal. The meeting concluded that education and training remain the most essential tools for preparing defence and security forces as actors for human security. Partnerships are thus being discussed with the peacekeeping school in Bamako and with the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra in relation to this proposal.

53. Together with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, UNOWA co-organized from 22 to 24 June in Senegal a meeting of subregional experts on the reinforcement of the gender dimension in West African national security sectors. The meeting helped to identify concrete measures and best practices existing in several countries and resulted in networking arrangements between West African gender and security sector reform experts with the Women for Peace and Security Network and the ECOWAS Gender Development Centre. These networks provided substantive inputs into the tenth anniversary commemoration in West Africa of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), marked by the Dakar Declaration of 17 September 2010, which stressed the need for West African States

to include a gender dimension in security sector reform processes. Partnerships on gender and security sector reform were also strengthened between the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and INSTRAW. More specifically, UNOWA cooperated with both organizations during the case study on gender and security sector reform in Sierra Leone and the assessment conducted in Mauritania.

54. In Guinea, despite a break in the implementation of the recommendations contained in the May 2010 joint ECOWAS/African Union/United Nations security sector assessment report, owing to the focus on the elections, the report continued to be acknowledged by international partners and national stakeholders as a broad basis for launching a comprehensive security sector reform process in the country. UNOWA is in the process of coordinating a follow-up mission to Guinea in December, with the Security Sector Reform Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, to reinforce the work of the United Nations country team in this area and to reiterate the central role of ECOWAS in supporting security sector reform in Guinea, with the engagement of international and bilateral partners.

E. Elections and stability

55. Elections continued to be a major priority for action across West Africa, as demonstrated by the sustained efforts to create conditions propitious for the holding of peaceful and credible polls in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire. The focus on election-related challenges will remain high as a large number of electoral processes are scheduled to take place across the subregion in the next two years.

56. During the period under review, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea organized presidential elections, while Niger held a referendum on its new Constitution. More than 20 presidential and legislative elections are scheduled to take place in West Africa in 2011 and 2012, in addition to local elections and referendums. While this electoral trend is a reflection of the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of the subregion in the democratic project in West Africa, contemporary experience also shows that the credibility of the processes can be undermined by election-related violence and sometimes by the lack of transparency and accountability.

57. In my previous reports, I underlined the paradoxical situation in West Africa, where elections are increasingly emerging as the route to both peace and violence. While I am encouraged that when elections are well prepared and carried out in fair, transparent and peaceful conditions, they can contribute to the strengthening of democracy and peace in a given country, I am aware that the reverse could also be the case. When elections are held in conditions that violate democratic norms, they often fuel violence and exacerbate political tension and instability. Unfortunately, flawed electoral processes have become a recurrent concern across West Africa for sometime now.

IV. Inter-institutional cooperation

58. My Special Representative convened the twenty-ninth high-level meeting of the heads of the United Nations peace missions in West Africa, held in Dakar on 29 September 2010. The Heads of Mission in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone welcomed the decision by the Security Council to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) for another year with the requisite military and police personnel levels. They also expressed satisfaction with the inclusion of Liberia on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission, for which the Government has prioritized security sector reform, the rule of law and national reconciliation. They reiterated their support for the efforts of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) in facilitating the electoral process in Côte d'Ivoire, and expressed their support for the work that the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) is doing in promoting political dialogue and national reconciliation, as well as UNIPSIL support for the preparations for the 2012 elections in Sierra Leone. The Heads of Mission also took note of developments in Guinea-Bissau since the military-political crisis of 1 April 2010. They underscored the need to enhance security of State institutions, promote genuine dialogue and tackle impunity, drug trafficking and transnational organized crime.

59. From 25 to 27 June 2010, UNOWA participated in the twentieth inter-mission Force Commanders' Conference, which was held in Monrovia. Discussions focused on cross-border issues, including regional security and political stability, and the protection of civilians. Other challenges to peace and security considered by the Force Commanders, included mob violence increasingly observed in a number of West African countries, the reintegration of ex-combatants, unemployed volatile groups (essentially the youth), land disputes, organized crime, and contested electoral processes. A major outcome of the conference was the decision by UNOCI and UNMIL to launch joint patrolling of shared border areas of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia. The issue of Liberian refugees in Côte d'Ivoire was also discussed. The focus was on the fact that some of the refugees are ex-combatants, who could pose a threat to peace and stability in the subregion. The Missions and the Force Commanders decided to remain vigilant to prevent any deterioration of the situation along the borders of mission areas.

60. On 7 September, UNOWA convened a meeting of United Nations regional directors in Dakar, during which my Special Representative updated them on the consultations held in New York on the occasion of the presentation of the report of the Secretary-General on West Africa. That meeting also discussed the efforts made by the United Nations system to address the various problems facing the Sahel and resulted in a shared commitment by several United Nations agencies to contribute to the tenth anniversary celebrations of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000).

V. Cooperation with regional and subregional partners

61. During the period under review, UNOWA continued to give priority to cooperation with regional organizations as reflected in the increase in joint missions with ECOWAS and the African Union and initiatives on peacebuilding and conflict prevention, as well as its active participation in regional policymaking meetings. In this context, UNOWA and ECOWAS held on 14 October a high-level consultative

meeting in Abuja to exchange views on a number of areas of common concern, ranging from specific crisis situations in West Africa to transborder and cross-cutting issues. The meeting reviewed the situation in Guinea, Niger, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire, and discussed thematic issues, including human security, drug trafficking and organized crime, human rights and gender. ECOWAS and UNOWA agreed to hold biannual consultative meetings in order to review cooperation, coordinate activities and chart the way forward.

VI. Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

62. At its twenty-sixth session held in Abuja on 23 and 24 September, the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission reviewed the progress in the demarcation work. The demarcation process between the two countries started with the onsite installation of 388 boundary pillars constructed with the support of Trust Fund resources. The parties, however, have expressed concern over the cost of the pillar emplacement work coordinated by the United Nations Office for Project Services. The United Nations is preparing an updated estimate of the total cost of the demarcation to be reviewed at the twenty-seventh session of the Mixed Commission scheduled to be held in Yaoundé on 27 and 28 January 2011. This re-evaluation is critical to the plan for the mobilization of the resources required to complete the demarcation exercise. The Mixed Commission also adopted recommendations for the formulation of a "resource clause" on off-shore petroleum fields straddling the maritime boundary, paving the way for cross-boundary cooperation on oil and gas.

63. Regarding the situation in the Bakassi peninsula, the thirteenth and fourteenth meetings of the Follow-up Committee were held in Geneva on 5 and 6 July and 28 and 29 October, respectively. Both meetings took place in a constructive atmosphere of cooperation. The parties considered and endorsed the reports of the visits to the peninsula undertaken by the joint Observers Group from 5 to 7 April and 18 to 20 October. At both meetings, the Committee underscored the atmosphere of peace prevailing in the peninsula among the communities, as well as between the inhabitants and the security and defence forces in their respective areas.

64. As part of the efforts to promote and contribute to confidence-building measures among the affected populations in the Bakassi peninsula and the Lake Chad area, my Special Representative convened a meeting in Dakar with the United Nations Resident Coordinators in Cameroon and Nigeria, on 6 November, which resulted in organizing a meeting between the two United Nations country teams, scheduled to be held in Abuja on 7 December.

VII. Observations and recommendations

65. I welcome the progress made in the last three years in the prevention and the resolution of violent conflict in West Africa. The peacebuilding processes in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau recorded tangible progress while prospects for political stability improved in Guinea, Mauritania and Niger. Togo elected a new president peacefully in March 2010. Mauritania returned to constitutional order after successful presidential elections held in June 2009. In Niger, the transition towards the peaceful restoration of constitutional order remains on course. I commend the people of Guinea, the national authorities, political leaders and their supporters for

the conduct of its first truly multiparty presidential election in June and November 2010, after years of political instability and several cycles of electoral violence. I express my deep gratitude to all those who worked tirelessly for a peaceful transition in Guinea, including Guinea's leaders, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, in his capacity as the ECOWAS Mediator for Guinea, representatives of the African Union and ECOWAS, and Guinea's other international partners. I also pay tribute to my Special Representative for being available to accompany Guinea and the region through this process that led him to make over 13 trips to Guinea in 2010.

66. The significant gains achieved in securing peace and stability in West Africa remain fragile, however, and need to be strengthened. Unconstitutional changes of government have threatened to reverse important democratic gains. I am also concerned that election-related violence has been a persistent challenge in several West African countries. Insufficient democratic control over the armed forces, poor discipline within defence and security institutions and tense civil-military relations are destabilizing factors across the region. Efforts also need to be intensified in the fight against impunity. In this context, the implementation of the recommendations of the International Commission of Inquiry established following the September 2009 incidents in Guinea remains among the high priorities.

67. I recognize the considerable achievements made by the subregional organizations such as ECOWAS and the Mano River Union in implementing institutional reforms and in strengthening their normative frameworks and capacity for conflict prevention and management. The transformation of the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat into a Commission and its focus on peace and security issues are testimony to this new trend. I am particularly impressed with the significant progress of ECOWAS in the implementation of its Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999), its Protocol on Democracy and Governance (2001) and its Conflict Prevention Framework (2008). With the support of UNOWA, ECOWAS has established a Standby Force and has developed an early warning capacity through its early warning system (ECOWARN).

68. Over the past three years, UNOWA endeavoured to accompany subregional efforts in support of peace and stability. I am encouraged by the strengthened cooperation and partnership with regional organizations, especially ECOWAS and the African Union, and the wider international community. This cooperation, together with greater coherence and complementarity among United Nations entities in West Africa, has allowed for a more effective and coordinated response to threats to peace and security in the region.

69. The prevalence of political instability in various parts of West Africa since the renewal of the mandate of UNOWA in 2007 has resulted in increased demands for my Special Representative's good offices and for United Nations support for the enhancement of regional capacities for mediation. I wish to note that alongside ECOWAS and the African Union, my Special Representative engaged in numerous preventive diplomacy initiatives in response to situations of unconstitutional changes of government and election-related instability in particular. I wish to express my gratitude to those donors that provided us with extrabudgetary resources to deploy dedicated mediation experts to provide day-to-day political support for the

transition processes and the work of the United Nations country teams in Guinea and Niger.

70. I am pleased that UNOWA guidance has been increasingly requested for political and technical facilitation of security sector reform-related processes. This was the case in Guinea, where an ECOWAS/African Union/United Nations assessment of the security sector was successfully conducted in 2010. The United Nations will continue to put great emphasis on preventing election-related violence by assessing the role of the army and other security institutions in electoral processes. With the recent launch of a long-term cooperation arrangement with ECOWAS, regional women's groups and international entities, UNOWA will work closely on promoting gender mainstreaming into West African national security sector programmes.

71. I encourage Member States and regional organizations to ensure effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions pertaining to women and peace and security. The commemoration of the tenth anniversary of resolution 1325 (2000) and the adoption of the Dakar Declaration of 17 September 2010 stressed, inter alia, the need for West African States to include a gender dimension in security sector reform processes.

72. I acknowledge the progress made in the implementation of the 2002 ruling of the International Court of Justice and the 2006 Greentree Agreement, including progress in the demarcation of the land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. I urge the parties to maintain the political momentum for the implementation of the border agreement, especially in securing agreement on all areas of the land boundary between the two countries and the physical demarcation of the boundary in application of the 2002 ruling of the International Court of Justice.

73. I am concerned that the structural and institutional weaknesses continue to hamper the ability of States to ensure respect for the rule of law, boost economic growth, address deeply rooted inequalities, fight corruption, reduce youth unemployment, deliver public goods and services and ensure adequate distribution of political power. Food insecurity, especially in Niger and the broader Sahel region, remains a major humanitarian concern in the subregion, with implications for long-term stability. Further progress is also needed in improving human rights records in a number of countries and in ensuring that commitments made to mainstream gender in conflict prevention and management processes are implemented as a priority.

74. Despite the important steps in recent years to combat terrorist activities and transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking and human trafficking, the established regional mechanisms are still in the early stages and have yet to produce concrete outcomes. More focus should be placed on enhancing national capacities to collect, analyse and exchange information related to illicit activities and transnational organized crime on a regular basis. The international community also needs to step up its support for regional endeavours on combating the threats to peace and stability as a result of the illicit trafficking in drugs and cross-border crimes.

75. I welcome the measures being taken by ECOWAS member States in implementing the political declaration and regional action plan to combat drug trafficking and organized crime, with the support of UNOWA, UNODC, INTERPOL and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Secretariat. I encourage

these stakeholders to continue the implementation of the West African Coast Initiative in the four pilot countries, namely, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone. UNOWA, in close collaboration with other partners, will continue to play its advocacy and coordinating role at regional and respective national levels. In order to promote a more comprehensive international response to drug trafficking, I urge close cooperation among the countries of origin in Latin America and countries of destination in Europe in order to support West African efforts. This should be done in consultation with UNODC.

76. The increasingly large number of requests from ECOWAS and its member States, members of the Security Council and United Nations partners, for UNOWA engagement and support for preventive diplomacy and for addressing the cross-cutting root causes of conflict demonstrates the added value of the Office in contributing to regional conflict prevention and peace efforts. It also underscores the dividends derived from a regional approach to conflict prevention in Africa. At the same time, however, it also constitutes a major challenge for UNOWA, given its limited resources. The support from extrabudgetary funding and the use of consultants have helped in meeting some of these demands, especially in the areas of security sector reform and mediation. I therefore recommend that the mandate of the Office be renewed for a further period of three years, from 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2013, subject to reporting every six months on the fulfilment by UNOWA of its revised mandate.

77. To ensure that UNOWA strikes a balance between the expectations from the region and the international community, and the resources available to the Office, I recommend that in its renewed mandate the Office should focus on four strategic directions:

(i) Preventive diplomacy: efforts pertaining to violence and crisis prevention will be strengthened. My Special Representative will continue to carry out good offices on my behalf in the subregion. In this context, we hope to enhance national and subregional capacities for mediation, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission will also continue to offer my good offices to facilitate the full implementation of the International Court of Justice ruling of 10 October 2002 on the land and maritime boundary dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria;

(ii) Addressing cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security: UNOWA will work with other partners to enhance subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and stability, especially regional initiatives in the Sahel area. In this context, UNOWA will facilitate the adoption of a regional security sector reform framework and tackle the interdependence between security sector reform and the fight against organized crime and drug trafficking and election-related instability;

(iii) Promotion of good governance and gender: UNOWA will build on its current work with regional organizations and other United Nations agencies in working to improve electoral processes, address issues of impunity, and promote respect for the rule of law and human rights. In line with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), UNOWA will work closely with various groups to ensure the incorporation of women in peace and security issues, including on security sector reform issues. It will do so by building upon the established collaboration between

UNOWA and West African member States and women's groups on issues related to resolution 1325 (2000);

(iv) **Partnership with regional organizations**. UNOWA will continue to mobilize the international community in favour of peace and security in West Africa through enhanced partnership with regional and subregional organizations, especially at the working level. In this regard, priority will be given to support ECOWAS in the establishment of its mediation division.

78. At the last presentation of my report to the Security Council, on 13 July 2010, the members of the Council requested that an independent study on UNOWA be brought to their attention. That study shall be submitted to the members of the Security Council.

79. In conclusion, I would like to reiterate my appreciation to West African States, ECOWAS, the African Union and the Mano River Union for their continued cooperation with UNOWA. I also extend my gratitude to the United Nations entities in West Africa, civil society organizations and other partners for their continued collaboration with UNOWA in the implementation of its mandate. I wish to thank my Special Representative, Said Djinnit, as well as the staff of UNOWA and the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission for their valuable contribution to peace and stability in the subregion.

United Nations A/65/601–S/2010/615

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
7 December 2010

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-fifth session
Agenda items 34, 39, 66 and 75

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts

Letter dated 3 December 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia, recorded for the months of October and November 2010 (see annex). As a result, one officer and one soldier of the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan were killed and four Azerbaijani soldiers were wounded.

In addition, according to mass media reports, on 19 November 2010 an incident involving the use of firearms and resulting in casualties took place in one of the military units of the armed forces of Armenia deployed in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. It has been reported that four conscripts (Levon Esayan, Nerses Galoyan, Narek Saakyan and Never Sargsyan) were killed and four other conscripts (Sarkis Melkumyan, Khachik Aleksanyanm, Masis Grigoryan and Manvel Azroyan) were wounded as a result of non-combat violence and exchange of fire between Armenian militaries.

Attempts by Yerevan to conceal the citizenship of the aforementioned servicemen and their attachment to the regular armed forces of Armenia have failed and yet another piece of evidence testifying to this country's illegal military presence on the territory of Azerbaijan has become known. Thus, with reference to the Public Relations Department of the Investigation Unit of the Ministry of Defence of Armenia, mass media outlets reported that one of the wounded conscripts, Manvel Azroyan, has been accused of murder and other criminal offences and detained on remand. Most important is that the Investigation Unit of

10-67935 (E) 161210

Please recycle

the Ministry of Defence of Armenia is carrying out the investigation for a crime committed in the occupied territory of Azerbaijan and the accused is facing charges under the Criminal Code of Armenia. In other words, the Investigation Unit of the Ministry of Defence of Armenia exercises its powers beyond the territory of Armenia and this country's Criminal Code applies to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Furthermore, as has become known, Manvel Azroyan is a citizen and resident of Armenia (Armavir province, Nalbandian village); he has been drafted into the armed forces of Armenia and assigned to serve in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

This is not the only example of bloody incidents between Armenian militaries serving in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Whatever the causes of open confrontation and hostilities within the armed forces of Armenia, which reportedly have even nationally or ethnically motivated reasons, they unambiguously testify to the illegal military presence of Armenia in, and its effective control of, the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Besides, these incidents are a yet another striking illustration of the complete collapse of Armenia's annexationist policy and the obvious demoralization and disorganization of its armed forces.

Moreover, the mentioned period was also marked by military exercises of the armed forces of Armenia in the occupied Aghdam and Khojavand districts of Azerbaijan and unprecedented aggressive statement by President Serzh Sargsyan of Armenia, who personally observed these exercises together with his Minister for Defence, Seyran Oganyan. The President of Armenia, inter alia, said: "If the time comes, we will not only do again what we did in 1992-94 but will go even further and solve the issue once and for all; the issue will be closed for good," adding that "If the time comes again, this time our blow will be final and deadly" (see official website of the President of Armenia, available from www.president.am/events/statements.eng/?id=74). These cynical and nostalgic words, glorifying the heinous crimes perpetrated in the course of aggression against Azerbaijan by the armed forces of Armenia and the official Yerevan-backed irregular armed bands, mercenaries and terrorist groups, are self-explanatory and illustrative as to the real intentions of Armenia and its unwillingness to settle the conflict through negotiations and in a constructive manner. It is notable that the President of Armenia delivered his speech in Azerbaijan's occupied district of Aghdam, the seizure of which was condemned and the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal from which was demanded by the Security Council in resolution 853 (1993).

Such a provocative warlike gesture of Armenia and bellicose rhetoric of its high-ranking officials obviously run counter to this country's stated commitments both under international law and within the ongoing political process towards the resolution of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is essential to note in this regard that the aforementioned military exercises and hostile statements coincided with the expected more decisive efforts to reach a negotiated settlement of the conflict, including in the context of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan.

It is absolutely clear that, for the purposes of durable and lasting peace, stability and cooperation, Armenia must cease its destructive policy of annexation and ethnic cleansing, renounce its attempts to discredit the peace process within the OSCE Minsk Group and negotiate in good faith in order to reach the international law-based settlement of the conflict, providing for the complete withdrawal of

Armenian armed forces from all the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, the restoration of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, the return of the forcibly displaced population to their places of origin and the peaceful coexistence of Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in the Nagorno-Karabakh region within the Republic of Azerbaijan.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34, 39, 66 and 75, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Tofig **Musayev**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex to the letter dated 3 December 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia[1] recorded for the months of October and November 2010

Date	*Time*	*Direction*	*Fire point area*	*Used Weapons*	*Casualties & Damages*
1 October	12.10-12.30	Six	Ashagi Abdulrahmanli and Gorgan villages, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	16.15-16.25		Berkaber and Azatamut villages, Ijevan district, Armenia	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	20.00-20.30		Gapanli and Gizil Oba villages, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
2 October	04.05-04.50	Two	Gapanli and Gizil Oba villages, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
3 October	08.40-08.50	Four	Unknown heights, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	14.20-14.40 23.25-23.35		Bash Garvand and Javahirli villages, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	16.00-16.45 18.30-18.55		Unknown heights, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
4 October	00.15-00.30	Three	Unknown heights, Goygol district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	19.00-19.17		Unknown heights, Noyemberyan district, Armenia	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	20:25-20:35		Unknown heights, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
5 October	00:10-00:20	Eight	Kangarli village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	02:30-02:45 05:20-05:40		Gizil Oba and Goyarkh villages, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	05:30-05:45		Goran, Ashagi Abdulrahmanli and Goradiz villages, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	10:30-10:40 14:30-14:35		Unkown heights, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	19:10-19:25		Ashagi Abdulrahmanli village, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—

[1] Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under the occupation by the Republic of Armenia or close to fire point areas.

Date	*Time*	*Direction*	*Fire point area*	*Used Weapons*	*Casualties & Damages*
7 October	17.45-17.50	Nine	Unknown heights, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	10.50-11.00 17.25-17.50		Gulustan village, Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	11.15-11.50		Kuropatkino village, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	11.15-11.50		Yusifjanli and Javahirli villages, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	19.25-20.00		Gapanli village, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	21.50-22.35		Chakhirli village, Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	22.00-22.30		Ashagi Abdulrakhmanli and Gorgan villages, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
8 October	05.10-05.20	Eight	Yusifjanli and Javahirli villages, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	10:35-10:40		Berkaber village, Ijevan district, Armenia	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	10:20-10:30		Tapgaragoyunlu village, Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	11:50-12:00 20:00-20:35		Unknown heights, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
9 October	18:35-18:40 21:30-21:40		Garakhanbayli village, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	00:05-00:10		Kangarli village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	00:25-00:45		Goyarkh village, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
10 October	09.40-09.55	Eight	Berkaber village, Ijevan district, Armenia	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	11.40-11.50 19.40-19.55		Tapgaragoyunlu village, Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	21.00-21.25		Seysulan village, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	22.25-22.30		Horadiz and Gorgan villages, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	22.30-22.45 22.40-22.50 23.00-23.05 23.20-23.30		Unknown heights, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	23.10-23.30		Yusifjanli and Garagashli villages, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	Soldier of Azerbaijani Army, Elgiz Rustamov, was wounded

Date	*Time*	*Direction*	*Fire point area*	*Used Weapons*	*Casualties & Damages*
12 October	10.30-10.40	Three	Tapgaragoyunlu village, Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	20.05-20.15		Unknown heights, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	20.05-20.15		Seysulan village, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
13 October	07:40-08:00 16:35-17:00	Four	Gulustan village, Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	12:55-13:00		Azamut village, Ijevan district, Armenia	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	12:50-13:00 15:45-16:05 22:40-22:50		Garakhanbayli and Horadiz villages, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
14 October	01.35-01.55	Eight	Gizil Oba village, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	04:00-04:30		Unknown heights, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	04:00-04:30 06:00-06:05		Marzili and Yusifjanli villages, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan's	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	10.00-10.15		Berkaber village, Ijevan district, Armenia	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	14.30-14.35		Unknown heights, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	14.40-14.35		Marzili village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	18.15-18.35		Ashagi Abdulrahmanli village, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
15 October	13.00-13.30	Three	Unknown heights, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	13.20-13.25		Tapgaragoyunlu village, Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	16.00-16.20		Gapanli village, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
17 October	13.50-14.25	One	Unknown heights, Dashkasan district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
18 October	01.20-01.45 02.00-02.30	Eleven	Seysulan and Gapanli villages, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	11.15-11.25		Unknown heights, Ijevan district, Armenia	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	17.45-17.55		Voskepar village, Noyenberyan district, Armenia	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	18.30-19.00 18.40-19.15		Tapgaragoyunlu and Gulustan villages, Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—

Date	*Time*	*Direction*	*Fire point area*	*Used Weapons*	*Casualties & Damages*
	19.25-20.00 23.30-23.55		Seysulan, Chayli and Goyarkh villages, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	22.20-22.25		Aygepar village, Berd district, Armenia	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	23.20-23.40		Kangarli village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
19 October	03.05-03.25	Seven	Seysulan, Chayli and Goyarkh villages, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	16.15-16.40 20.20-20.35		Gapanli village, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	22.00-23.40		Ashagi Abdulrahmanli and Gorgan villages, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	22.30-22.35		Yusifjanli village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
20 October	11.00-11.30 16.20-16.25	Seven	Unknown heights, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	
	15.50-16.10 16.20-16.30 21.15-21.20		Ashagi Abdulrahmanli, Garakhanbayli and Horadiz villages, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	
	16.50-17.30		Tapgaragoyunlu village, Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	23.15-23.40		Chayli and Gizil Oba villages, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
21 October	00.30-01.10 05.05-05.15	Eleven	Chayli and Gizil Oba villages, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	00.55-02.10		Javahirli village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	08.00-08.10 21.50-22.00		Yusifjanli village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	16.30-17.00		Unknown heights, Dashkasan district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	17.40-17.50		Garkhanbayli and Horadiz villages, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	17.50-20.10		Unknown heights, Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	19.00-19.30 19.35-20.05		Yarimja, Seysulan and Chayli villages, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
22 October	01.30-01.45	Eight	Yarimja, Seysulan and Chayli villages, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	11.20-11.40 21.10-21.15		Tapgaragoyunlu and Gulustan villages, Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	17.00-17.05		Berkebar village, Ijevan district, Armenia	Firearm & Machinegun	—

Date	*Time*	*Direction*	*Fire point area*	*Used Weapons*	*Casualties & Damages*
	14.10-14.55		Unknown heights, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	20.45-21.10		Seysulan village, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
24 October	23.25-23.30 24.40-24.45	Three	Gorgan, Ashagi Abdulrahmanli and Ashagi Seyidahmadli villages, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
25 October	00.20-00.30	Seven	Gorgan, Ashagi Abdulrahmanli and Ashagi Seyidahmadli villages, Fizuli district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	00.35-00.40		Chakhirli village, Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	11.40-12.05		Unknown heights, Vardenis district, Armenia	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	11.40-11.50 15.20-15.30		Unknown heights, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	17.00-17.10		Gulustan village, Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
26 October	09.20-09.25	Two	Unknown heights, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	16.55-17.40		Unknown heights, Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	Soldier of Azerbaijani Army, Rasul Hajizade, was wounded
27 October	04.35-05.05	One	Chayli village, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
28 October	07.10-07.45	One	Unknown heights, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	Soldier of Azerbaijani Army, Telman Mustafayev, was killed
29 October	16.30-16.35 22.05-22.15	Seven	Kuropatkino village, Khojavand district Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	17.10-17.12		Marzili village, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	18.00-18.05		Shavashavan village, Noemberyan district, Armenia	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	18.00-18.05 19.40-20.25		Azatamut and Berkaber villages, Ijevan district, Armenia	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	18.40-18.45		Gizil Oba village, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	23.30-23.55		Unknown heights, Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
31 October	16.20	Seven	Unknown heights, Gazakh district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	Soldier of the Azerbaijani Army, Farrukh Zeynalov, was wounded

Date	Time	Direction	Fire point area	Used Weapons	Casualties & Damages
	12:00-14:20 13:50-14:00 22:00-23:10		Sarijali, Shuraabad and Garagashli villages, Aghdam district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	15:45-16:00		Unknown heights, Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	12:25-13:00		Unknown heights, Dashkesen district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	17:10-17:35 20:10-20:15		Seysulan and Goyarkh villages, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
1 November	09:15-09:20	Four	Berdavan village, Noemberyan district, Armenia	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	12:45-13:00		Tapgaragoyunlu village, Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
	19:15-19:30 22:40-23:00		Gizil Oba and Chilaburt villages, Terter district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	—
11-13 November	---------- ---	---------- ----------	Aghdam and Khojavand districts, Azerbaijan	Heavy equipment, artillery and grad launchers, as well as firearm and machinegun	Armed forces of Armenia conducted large-scale military exercises in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Inhabitants of nearby frontline districts clearly heard explosions from the occupied Aghdam and Khojavand districts. Even houses had been shaken by the heavy artillery shells
19 November	11:00-11:25	One	Unknown heights, Khojavand district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	A 33-year-old, Lieutenant of Azerbaijani Army, Ibrahim Ibrahimov, was killed
20 November	04:15-04:43	One	Tapgaragoyunlu village, Goranboy district, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machinegun	Soldier of the Azerbaijani Army, Ishiyev Tural, was wounded

United Nations S/2010/616

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 December 2010

Original: English

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism

Letter dated 3 December 2010 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism, I have the honour to submit the report of the Counter-Terrorism Committee to the Security Council for its comprehensive consideration of the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (see annex), in accordance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 1805 (2008).

The Committee would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Ertugrul **Apakan**
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism

10-63016 (E) 151210

Please recycle

Report of the Counter-Terrorism Committee to the Security Council for its comprehensive consideration of the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

I. Introduction

1. By resolution 1535 (2004), the Security Council established the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate as a special political mission under the policy guidance of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. On 20 March 2008 the Security Council, by resolution 1805 (2008), renewed the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate as a special political mission under the policy guidance of the Committee for a period ending on 31 December 2010. In that resolution, the Council further decided to conduct a comprehensive consideration of the Executive Directorate's work prior to the expiration of its mandate.

2. The Counter-Terrorism Committee submitted its interim report (S/2009/289) to the Council in 2009 and received a report from the Executive Directorate (S/2010/569) on its work during the mandate period. The Committee has prepared the present report to assist the Council in its comprehensive consideration of the Executive Directorate. The Committee has also included recommendations on the future work of the Executive Directorate.

II. Implementation of the structural reorganization of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

3. The Security Council in resolution 1805 (2008) welcomed and affirmed the revised organizational plan for the Executive Directorate. In this regard, the Committee notes that the present structure of the Executive Directorate, consisting of three geographical clusters with five cross-cutting technical groups, supported by two smaller units, has served the Executive Directorate and the Committee well, enhancing its capacity to conduct its core business of engaging Member States on the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005). The clusters and groups have been actively engaged in the production of a revised global implementation survey (see S/2009/620, annex) and have prepared detailed technical briefings for the Committee and the full membership of the United Nations, the latter to enhance transparency about the work of the Committee. Two notable achievements during this period have been the publication of an updated global implementation survey and a technical guide that set out steps in a pragmatic manner to assist States in the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). The technical groups have established consistency in judgements about the implementation of specific provisions of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) and have established uniformity in reviewing to States, regions and subregions in that regard. The clusters continue to play an important role in engaging Member States and international organizations on assessments and the facilitation of technical assistance as well as in enhancing States' understanding of the work of the Committee and the Executive Directorate.

4. The Committee expects that the present structure of the technical working groups will continue to contribute to the achievements of the Executive Directorate in effectively fulfilling its mandates. The Committee will continue its discussion of

the future format of the global implementation survey in order to provide clear guidance and direction on the production of a new updated survey before the end of 2011.

III. Preparation of preliminary implementation assessments and stocktaking exercise

5. During the mandate period, the Executive Directorate prepared, and the Committee adopted, preliminary implementation assessments for all United Nations Member States. The Executive Directorate prepared and the Committee conducted a first review, or stocktaking, of revised preliminary implementation assessments for more than 100 States. This stocktaking exercise enabled the Committee to broaden and deepen its active dialogue with Member States; to learn where States continue to face particular challenges; and, more generally, to gain a better and more detailed understanding of the state of implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) on a global basis, as reflected in the global implementation survey. The Committee has also adopted a simplified procedure for the consideration of the preliminary implementation assessments in order to allow more time and resources to focus on concrete measures to implement resolution 1373 (2001) that make a difference on the ground in regions, subregions and individual States.

6. The Committee plans to review the format of the preliminary implementation assessment in order to enhance its usefulness as a diagnostic tool, and in this regard looks forward to the Executive Directorate's proposals for revitalizing and simplifying the preliminary implementation assessment, drawing on the information now available in the technical guide.

IV. Country visits

7. The Committee noted that the revised organizational plan for the Executive Directorate, outlining a more flexible approach to assessment missions, has been fully implemented and resulted in 36 visits to Member States during the mandate period. The total number of States visited and assessed since 2005 is now 56. The Committee believes that country visits remain an essential part of the Committee's and the Executive Directorate's work and are critical to understanding how States are evolving their counter-terrorism responses. Moreover, this improved engagement with States and regional organizations helps to form a more accurate and clearer understanding of the global implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) that can be reflected in a revised global implementation survey. This clarity helps the Executive Directorate to determine priorities for its regional and subregional activities, for the facilitation of technical assistance, and for conducting workshops and disseminating best practices.

8. The Committee looks forward to continuing this flexible approach to country visits, especially with regard to a new list of Member States that the Committee will approve and the Executive Directorate will visit during the coming two to three years, with the consent of the States it is proposed to visit.

V. Strengthening facilitation of technical assistance to States

9. The Committee and the Executive Directorate continue to play active roles as facilitators of technical assistance. The Committee notes that the Executive Directorate revised technical assistance strategy, endorsed by the Committee in July 2008, leveraged its in-depth knowledge of the counter-terrorism needs of States visited to engage major bilateral, regional and international donors. The strategy has also widened the circle of donors by including countries which have developed particularly effective counter-terrorism approaches or systems within their regions. Since implementing the revised strategy, the Executive Directorate has made 187 technical assistance referrals, which, in 43 cases, led to technical assistance delivery by bilateral or multilateral donors. The rest are still pending.

10. The Committee also recognizes that regional and subregional approaches have the potential to act as force multipliers and is incorporating this effect in designing its work programme. In the context of this regional approach, the Executive Directorate has identified several key areas for strengthening facilitation of technical assistance, namely, (1) strengthening border control systems and cross-border institutional cooperation among neighbouring States; (2) capacity-building activities, including those aimed at enhancing institutions and strengthening the rule of law; and (3) improving coordination and information-sharing among relevant national agencies, which has a significant impact on counter-terrorism capabilities and responses.

11. The Committee also notes that the Executive Directorate has adopted measures to bolster its outreach activities with potential donors, including those already engaged in capacity-building activities aimed at enhancing institutions and strengthening the rule of law. In so doing, the Executive Directorate has ensured that a greater number of referrals have been accepted by donors and that the identified technical assistance is successfully delivered to help States to further implement resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005).

12. The Committee encourages the Executive Directorate to update it regularly on the status of implementation of the revised technical assistance strategy and to keep it under active review, including new ideas for expanding the number of donors and the range of their activities in capacity-building.

VI. Engagement with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and other Security Council bodies

13. Under the guidance of the Committee, the Executive Directorate continues to serve as a core member of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, making significant contributions to its six working groups, respectively dealing with countering terrorist financing, human rights and counter-terrorism; the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes; preventing and resolving conflicts; the integrated assistance for countering terrorism initiative (the Executive Directorate is Co-Chair); and, most recently, establishing a group on border control (the Executive Directorate is Chair). The Executive Directorate officers frequently contact and interact with the newly created secretariat of the Task Force to share information and provide advice and technical support as needed. The Chair of the Task Force or his representative regularly attends the Executive Directorate's weekly senior

management meetings. In turn, the Executive Directorate attends the weekly staff meetings of the Task Force. The Executive Directorate and the Task Force secretariat continue their work on a capacity-building project in two Member States within the context of the integrated assistance for countering terrorism initiative, which aims to facilitate technical assistance to Member States with an integrated approach to the Executive Directorate implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

14. Under the common strategies of the three Security Council Committees, and also within the framework of the Task Force, the three expert groups of the Security Council's subsidiary counter-terrorism bodies (the Executive Directorate, the Monitoring Team of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) and the Expert Group of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)) have actively coordinated their activities and continue to share information. The three expert groups also work closely together to enhance the capacities of Member States to understand the requirements for effective implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions related to terrorism. One approach is to conduct regional workshops to assist Member States lacking the capacity to submit responses to the three Security Council Committees dealing with terrorism. The three expert groups also continue to implement their common strategy to work jointly, as appropriate, with international, regional and subregional organizations, as well as relevant United Nations entities, in order to avoid overlap and utilize available resources in an appropriate manner and to invite each other on assessment visits to States.

15. The Committee encourages enhanced collaboration between the Executive Directorate, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and its entities, and in particular other counter-terrorism groups of experts of the Security Council within their respective mandates, including in the exchange of information, in developing common strategies, and in organizing joint workshops and joint country visits, in order to better assist Member States' implementation of relevant resolutions of the United Nations on combating terrorism.

VII. Engagement with international, regional and subregional organizations

16. The Committee recognizes that international, regional and subregional organizations are key partners to assist Member States in implementing relevant Security Council resolutions. The Committee and the Executive Directorate work closely with several partner international organizations that provide expert assistance, advice and support in relation to assessment missions, conferences and workshops; in the development and promotion of good practices; and in the provision of technical assistance pursuant to Executive Directorate referrals.

17. The Committee welcomes the close and deepening collaboration and cooperation among the Committee, the Executive Directorate and all of its partner organizations. It plans to conduct its next special meeting with all relevant organizations during the first half of 2011.

VIII. Human rights

18. The Committee and the Executive Directorate recognize that counter-terrorism strategies and activities can only be fully effective in the long term if they are firmly grounded in the rule of law and are consistent with international human rights law and international humanitarian obligations. The Committee notes that the human rights aspects of countering terrorism had been routinely raised during country visits, workshops, videoconferences and other exchanges with Member States. The Executive Directorate also continues to enhance its cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, including by means of joint development of relevant technical assistance for States in the refugee and human rights fields. The Executive Directorate has also maintained an active dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism and draws on his reports in preparing for assessment missions and workshops.

19. The Committee welcomes the continuing activities of the Executive Directorate in this area and requests it to develop them further, in line with the Committee's human rights policy guidance, to ensure that all relevant human rights issues are addressed consistently and even-handedly in its activities. The Committee also calls for continued cooperation of the Executive Directorate with all relevant partners, including the working group of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force on protecting human rights while countering terrorism.

IX. Implementation of Security Council resolution 1624 (2005)

20. The Committee welcomes continued dialogue of the Executive Directorate with Member States on their efforts to implement resolution 1624 (2005). At the beginning of November 2010, a total of 109 States have submitted reports to the Committee on the implementation of the resolution. The Committee notes that counter-terrorism measures can be most effective when they are approached holistically, incorporating consideration of conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism as well its prevention. Establishment of appropriate national mechanisms will help States to develop and implement comprehensive counter-terrorism strategies. The Committee, recognizing the special role of local communities, the private sector, civil society and the media in this regard, encourages the Executive Directorate to continue developing initiatives to identify and spread best legal practices and strategies for countering incitement and violent extremism. The Executive Directorate should conduct its efforts in cooperation with other key players, including regional and subregional organizations.

21. The Committee welcomes the work of the Executive Directorate on Security Council resolution 1624 (2005) and encourages the Executive Directorate, in close cooperation with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and its working groups, to strengthen its efforts to identify and spread best legal practice to prohibit and prevent incitement to commit terrorist acts. The Committee urges the Executive Directorate to work with States as well as regional and subregional organizations to develop strategies for countering incitement to terrorist acts motivated by extremism and intolerance, as called for in resolution 1624 (2005) and the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The Committee requests the Executive

Directorate to prepare a report for its consideration on the status of the global implementation of resolution 1624 (2005) by the end of 2011.

X. Public communications and outreach

22. The Committee welcomes the Executive Directorate's active implementation of its communications strategy, which focuses on engagement with Member States, international organizations, relevant academic research institutions, civil society, media and the private sector with a view to enhancing understanding of, and engagement with, the Committee and the Executive Directorate. This work is being partially merged into the Task Force framework in concert with the Department of Public Information. The Executive Directorate has revitalized the Committee's website, and maintains and constantly updates its content in all six official languages. It also distributes a current press kit, especially during visits to States or at conferences or workshops.

23. The Committee encourages the Executive Directorate to provide updates on the implementation of the communications strategy on a regular basis and to maintain and update the Committee's website in all six official languages.

XI. Organization and operation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

24. The Committee has taken note of the report of the Executive Directorate stating that the Executive Directorate is adequately staffed to conduct an ambitious programme of activities under a new mandate and to support the Committee, in cooperation with its Task Force partners, in conducting assessment visits, hosting workshops, and facilitating technical assistance to Member States. In addition, the Committee takes note of the view of the Executive Directorate that the establishment of a voluntary trust fund could facilitate activities, as approved by the Committee, using extrabudgetary funding more efficiently and transparently.

25. The Committee expresses its intention to further discuss the need of the Executive Directorate to establish a consistent, efficient and transparent means of handling extrabudgetary funding for activities that have been approved by the Committee.

26. The Committee welcomes the proposals of the Executive Directorate on adjustments to its organizational structure and operational practice.

XII. Conclusions

27. During the mandate period, the Executive Directorate has fulfilled the tasks assigned by the Committee, as set out in the Executive Directorate's work programmes, and as set out in the Committee's work programmes.

28. Moreover, the Committee welcomes the measurable achievements of the Executive Directorate since the adoption of resolution 1805 (2008), in particular, its deepening dialogue with Member States in all regions, executing a more proactive strategy to facilitate technical assistance, and engaging in close collaboration and

cooperation with its international, regional and subregional partner organizations and relevant Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force entities.

29. The Committee believes that a renewal of the mandate of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate for a further period of three years will greatly serve the Committee in monitoring — and enhancing the capacities — of Member States in implementing the resolutions of the Security Council.

United Nations A/65/606–S/2010/617

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
8 December 2010
English
Original: Russian

General Assembly
Sixty-fifth session
Agenda items 66, 68, 85, 117 and 120

Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

Promotion and protection of human rights

The rule of law at the national and international levels

Implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations

Strengthening of the United Nations system

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Letter dated 6 December 2010 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith for your information declarations by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on the occasion of the sixty-fifth anniversary of the opening of the Nuremberg trials of the major Nazi war criminals (see annex I) and by the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on the occasion of the sixty-fifth anniversary of the Nuremberg trials (see annex II). I would be grateful if you could have these published and circulated as documents of the General Assembly under agenda items 66, 68, 85, 117 and 120.

(*Signed*) Alexander **Pankin**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

10-68217 (E) 211210 211210

Please recycle

Annex I to the letter dated 6 December 2010 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Declaration by the State Duma

On the occasion of the sixty-fifth anniversary of the opening of the Nuremberg trials of the major Nazi war criminals

The members of the State Duma of the Russian Federation note the abiding importance of the decisions of the International Military Tribunal for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis (hereinafter "the Tribunal") and, in particular, the historic establishment of the Tribunal itself, the first ever international court of its kind.

The history of international criminal justice begins with the Nuremberg trials. The principles enshrined in the Charter of the Tribunal were soon reaffirmed by decisions of the United Nations General Assembly as principles of international law. By handing down convictions on the Nazi criminals, the Tribunal gave legal underpinnings to the definitive rout of fascism and determined that wars of aggression were crimes against peace.

The Nuremberg trial, which was preceded by extensive diplomatic efforts undertaken by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with the Allied Powers, offered a vivid illustration of the constructive, ideology-free interaction between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. Forces of very different nature, which had risen in opposition to a common enemy, were able to set aside the differences between them in the name of the primacy of justice and the international rule of law.

The Tribunal's decisions are of relevance today as well. Any attempt to revise, deny or distort them should be deemed a violation of the universally recognized norms and principles of international law, in blatant disregard of the will of the United Nations.

Attempts to shift the blame for the outbreak of the Second World War from Hitler's Germany to the Soviet Union — the country which initiated the creation of the Tribunal — are a deliberate and mendacious denial of history.

Actions of any kind designed to equate, in terms of "historical guilt", the Nazi regime, which systematically and relentlessly pursued the goal of world domination, with the social and political system that prevailed at that time in the Soviet Union are an affront to the veterans of the anti-fascist movement and profane the memory of the victims of the Holocaust, the prisoners of concentration camps, the tens of millions of people in Europe and, above all, those Soviet people who gave their lives in fighting the anti-human racial theories of Nazism.

Even during the Cold War no one tried to draw a parallel between the Nazi regime, which threatened to enslave and destroy entire peoples, and the politics of the Soviet Union, which proved to be the only force capable of withstanding the war machine of Hitler's Germany and, in the closing stages of the Second World War, of ensuring its defeat.

Endeavours to justify Nazism, alongside the nationalist-oriented right-wing extremist movements in some European countries which are seeking to make folk

heroes out of their war criminals, are a source of grave concern to the State Duma. Often more space in school textbooks is devoted to the so-called "exploits" of Nazi collaborators than to the Nuremberg trials, which consigned those collaborators to eternal condemnation. The desecration of monuments to those who conquered fascism is tolerated and the memory hallowed of those who acted on the side of the aggressors. Accomplices in the perpetration of fascist atrocities are rehabilitated and presented with State awards while soldiers who fought in the ranks of the anti-Hitler coalition are subject to persecution.

One direct consequence of such efforts was, in particular, the verdict handed down by the European Court of Human Rights against Vladimir Kononov, a citizen of the Russian Federation and veteran of the Great Patriotic War, a verdict which provoked public outrage.

All responsible political leaders should always remember: the Tribunal categorically affirmed that there can be no justification for complicity in crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The State Duma calls on international organizations and the parliaments of the world to condemn in the strongest terms and to resist any attempts to resuscitate fascist, far-right, racist and nationalist ideologies in their own countries and anywhere else, basing such condemnation and resistance on the unequivocal and universally valid decisions of the Tribunal.

The State Duma welcomes the adoption on 16 November 2010 by the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly of resolution 65/36 on the inadmissibility of certain practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, which contains a direct reference to the Charter of the Tribunal, and also to the Judgement of the Tribunal, which recognized, among other things, the SS organization and all its integral parts, including the Waffen SS, as criminal and declared it responsible for many war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The State Duma expresses its regret that, masking their true intentions with slogans about European solidarity and affirmations of the freedom of speech and assembly, a number of European countries did not support that resolution. The position of the European Union, which effectively calls into question the Tribunal's decisions, is both surprising and difficult to understand.

The members of the State Duma call on all countries of the world to support the aforementioned resolution when it is put to the vote at a forthcoming plenary meeting of the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly and thereby to make their contribution to efforts to prevent the resurgence of the "brown plague" of the twentieth century in this new century.

B. V. **Gryzlov**
Speaker, State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

(*Stamp*) Protocol Department, State Duma of the
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

Moscow,
23 November 2010

A/65/686
S/2010/617

Annex II to the letter dated 6 December 2010 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Declaration by the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

On the occasion of the sixty-fifth anniversary of the Nuremberg trials

The Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation takes note of the sixty-fifth anniversary of the launching of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, which gave legal underpinning to the final defeat of fascism, and draws the attention of the international community to the need to resist attempts by certain forces to distort and diminish the historic role of the Nuremberg trials and thereby to rewrite the outcome of the Second World War and to justify the Nazis, their accomplices and the atrocities that they committed.

The International Military Tribunal, established under the London Agreement between the four allied Powers of 8 August 1945, identified Hitler's Germany as the State responsible for initiating the Second World War and condemned its unscrupulous, treacherous politics and racist ideology. It has gone down in the annals of history as the court by which the peoples passed judgement on the leaders of Nazi Germany, thereby setting a precedent for the jurisdiction of an international tribunal over the top officials, politicians and military leaders of an aggressor State.

The Nuremberg trials played an exceptionally important role in the progressive development of modern international law and the establishment of international criminal justice. The principles enshrined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal and reaffirmed in resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly of 11 December 1946 and 27 November 1947 formed the bedrock for post-war international legal instruments designed to prevent the outbreak of wars and the commission of war crimes, genocide, acts of torture and other atrocities, and also to preclude the application of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The judgements of the Nuremberg Tribunal remain relevant today as well, when there are increasingly frequent attempts to rewrite the history of the Second World War and a conspicuous desire to lay the blame for unleashing that war not only on Hitler's Germany, but also on the Soviet Union, which suffered a treacherous onslaught and which made the most decisive contribution to the routing of the fascist German aggressors.

The Russian Federation has repeatedly voiced sharp criticism for the policies and actions of certain European countries where veterans of the Great Patriotic War and activists of anti-fascist movements have been hauled before the criminal courts, where marches and rallies of the members of former Nazi and collaborator units have been permitted, and where monuments to Soviet military liberators have been destroyed. For our people, who suffered massive losses in the Great Patriotic War, such actions are an affront and an abomination.

On this, the sixty-fifth anniversary of the victory over fascism, the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation strongly affirms that the Nuremberg trials are of timeless historical significance and that their outcome is not

subject to revision. The work of the International Military Tribunal should stand as a vivid example of the triumph of justice and a reminder that retribution for crimes against peace and humanity is ineluctable. The tragic pages of history which were brought to a close by the Nuremberg Tribunal should not be repeated.

Being faithful to the principles of Nuremberg today means safeguarding and developing the spirit of cooperation and goodwill and remaining vigilant and intolerant of any attempts to breach international law.

The Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation calls on the international community to respect and uphold the principles of international criminal law elaborated in Nuremberg as an indispensable and indefeasible foundation of the modern world order.

(Stamp) Information and Documentation Department,
Office of the Federation Council of the
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

Moscow,
24 November 2010

United Nations

A/65/606* S/2010/617*

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
8 December 2010
English
Original: Russian

General Assembly
Sixty-fifth session
Agenda items 66, 68, 85, 117 and 120

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

Promotion and protection of human rights

The rule of law at the national and international levels

Implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations

Strengthening of the United Nations system

Letter dated 6 December 2010 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith for your information declarations by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on the occasion of the sixty-fifth anniversary of the opening of the Nuremberg trials of the major Nazi war criminals (see annex I) and by the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on the occasion of the sixty-fifth anniversary of the Nuremberg trials (see annex II). I would be grateful if you could have these circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 66, 68, 85, 117 and 120, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Alexander **Pankin**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* Reissued for technical reasons on 4 February 2011.

10-68217* (E) 070211

Please recycle

Annex I to the letter dated 6 December 2010 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Declaration by the State Duma

On the occasion of the sixty-fifth anniversary of the opening of the Nuremberg trials of the major Nazi war criminals

The members of the State Duma of the Russian Federation note the abiding importance of the decisions of the International Military Tribunal for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis (hereinafter "the Tribunal") and, in particular, the historic establishment of the Tribunal itself, the first ever international court of its kind.

The history of international criminal justice begins with the Nuremberg trials. The principles enshrined in the Charter of the Tribunal were soon reaffirmed by decisions of the United Nations General Assembly as principles of international law. By handing down convictions on the Nazi criminals, the Tribunal gave legal underpinnings to the definitive rout of fascism and determined that wars of aggression were crimes against peace.

The Nuremberg trial, which was preceded by extensive diplomatic efforts undertaken by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with the Allied Powers, offered a vivid illustration of the constructive, ideology-free interaction between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. Forces of very different nature, which had risen in opposition to a common enemy, were able to set aside the differences between them in the name of the primacy of justice and the international rule of law.

The Tribunal's decisions are of relevance today as well. Any attempt to revise, deny or distort them should be deemed a violation of the universally recognized norms and principles of international law, in blatant disregard of the will of the United Nations.

Attempts to shift the blame for the outbreak of the Second World War from Hitler's Germany to the Soviet Union — the country which initiated the creation of the Tribunal — are a deliberate and mendacious denial of history.

Actions of any kind designed to equate, in terms of "historical guilt", the Nazi regime, which systematically and relentlessly pursued the goal of world domination, with the social and political system that prevailed at that time in the Soviet Union are an affront to the veterans of the anti-fascist movement and profane the memory of the victims of the Holocaust, the prisoners of concentration camps, the tens of millions of people in Europe and, above all, those Soviet people who gave their lives in fighting the anti-human racial theories of Nazism.

Even during the Cold War no one tried to draw a parallel between the Nazi regime, which threatened to enslave and destroy entire peoples, and the politics of the Soviet Union, which proved to be the only force capable of withstanding the war machine of Hitler's Germany and, in the closing stages of the Second World War, of ensuring its defeat.

Endeavours to justify Nazism, alongside the nationalist-oriented right-wing extremist movements in some European countries which are seeking to make folk

heroes out of their war criminals, are a source of grave concern to the State Duma. Often more space in school textbooks is devoted to the so-called "exploits" of Nazi collaborators than to the Nuremberg trials, which consigned those collaborators to eternal condemnation. The desecration of monuments to those who conquered fascism is tolerated and the memory hallowed of those who acted on the side of the aggressors. Accomplices in the perpetration of fascist atrocities are rehabilitated and presented with State awards while soldiers who fought in the ranks of the anti-Hitler coalition are subject to persecution.

One direct consequence of such efforts was, in particular, the verdict handed down by the European Court of Human Rights against Vladimir Kononov, a citizen of the Russian Federation and veteran of the Great Patriotic War, a verdict which provoked public outrage.

All responsible political leaders should always remember: the Tribunal categorically affirmed that there can be no justification for complicity in crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The State Duma calls on international organizations and the parliaments of the world to condemn in the strongest terms and to resist any attempts to resuscitate fascist, far-right, racist and nationalist ideologies in their own countries and anywhere else, basing such condemnation and resistance on the unequivocal and universally valid decisions of the Tribunal.

The State Duma welcomes the adoption on 16 November 2010 by the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly of resolution 65/36 on the inadmissibility of certain practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, which contains a direct reference to the Charter of the Tribunal, and also to the Judgement of the Tribunal, which recognized, among other things, the SS organization and all its integral parts, including the Waffen SS, as criminal and declared it responsible for many war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The State Duma expresses its regret that, masking their true intentions with slogans about European solidarity and affirmations of the freedom of speech and assembly, a number of European countries did not support that resolution. The position of the European Union, which effectively calls into question the Tribunal's decisions, is both surprising and difficult to understand.

The members of the State Duma call on all countries of the world to support the aforementioned resolution when it is put to the vote at a forthcoming plenary meeting of the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly and thereby to make their contribution to efforts to prevent the resurgence of the "brown plague" of the twentieth century in this new century.

B. V. **Gryzlov**
Speaker, State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

(*Stamp*) Protocol Department, State Duma of the
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

Moscow,
23 November 2010

Annex II to the letter dated 6 December 2010 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Declaration by the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

On the occasion of the sixty-fifth anniversary of the Nuremberg trials

The Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation takes note of the sixty-fifth anniversary of the launching of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, which gave legal underpinning to the final defeat of fascism, and draws the attention of the international community to the need to resist attempts by certain forces to distort and diminish the historic role of the Nuremberg trials and thereby to rewrite the outcome of the Second World War and to justify the Nazis, their accomplices and the atrocities that they committed.

The International Military Tribunal, established under the London Agreement between the four allied Powers of 8 August 1945, identified Hitler's Germany as the State responsible for initiating the Second World War and condemned its unscrupulous, treacherous politics and racist ideology. It has gone down in the annals of history as the court by which the peoples passed judgement on the leaders of Nazi Germany, thereby setting a precedent for the jurisdiction of an international tribunal over the top officials, politicians and military leaders of an aggressor State.

The Nuremberg trials played an exceptionally important role in the progressive development of modern international law and the establishment of international criminal justice. The principles enshrined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal and reaffirmed in resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly of 11 December 1946 and 27 November 1947 formed the bedrock for post-war international legal instruments designed to prevent the outbreak of wars and the commission of war crimes, genocide, acts of torture and other atrocities, and also to preclude the application of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The judgements of the Nuremberg Tribunal remain relevant today as well, when there are increasingly frequent attempts to rewrite the history of the Second World War and a conspicuous desire to lay the blame for unleashing that war not only on Hitler's Germany, but also on the Soviet Union, which suffered a treacherous onslaught and which made the most decisive contribution to the routing of the fascist German aggressors.

The Russian Federation has repeatedly voiced sharp criticism for the policies and actions of certain European countries where veterans of the Great Patriotic War and activists of anti-fascist movements have been hauled before the criminal courts, where marches and rallies of the members of former Nazi and collaborator units have been permitted, and where monuments to Soviet military liberators have been destroyed. For our people, who suffered massive losses in the Great Patriotic War, such actions are an affront and an abomination.

On this, the sixty-fifth anniversary of the victory over fascism, the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation strongly affirms that the Nuremberg trials are of timeless historical significance and that their outcome is not

subject to revision. The work of the International Military Tribunal should stand as a vivid example of the triumph of justice and a reminder that retribution for crimes against peace and humanity is ineluctable. The tragic pages of history which were brought to a close by the Nuremberg Tribunal should not be repeated.

Being faithful to the principles of Nuremberg today means safeguarding and developing the spirit of cooperation and goodwill and remaining vigilant and intolerant of any attempts to breach international law.

The Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation calls on the international community to respect and uphold the principles of international criminal law elaborated in Nuremberg as an indispensable and indefeasible foundation of the modern world order.

(*Stamp*) Information and Documentation Department,
Office of the Federation Council of the
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

Moscow,
24 November 2010

United Nations S/2010/618

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 December 2010

Original: English

Note verbale dated 8 December 2010 from the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations presents its complements to the Office of the President of the Security Council for the month of December 2010, and has the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 6 December 2010 addressed to you from H.E. Mr. Hoshyar Zebari, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, regarding Iraq's fulfilment in the area of disarmament issues (see annex).

The Permanent Mission of Iraq also has the honour to request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

10-68908 (E) 141210

Please recycle

S/2010/618

Annex to the note verbale dated 8 December 2010 from the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

Baghdad, 6 December 2010

Further to my letter of 18 January 2010 to the President of the Security Council, my letters of 18 and 28 January 2010 to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and, in particular, my letter of 17 February 2010, in which I expressed Iraq's intention to voluntarily apply the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement pending its ratification by the Council of Representatives. It should be noted that the Additional Protocol is currently before the Council of Representatives for ratification. I should also like to refer to the Director General's letter, dated 11 March 2010, commending Iraq's excellent cooperation, and my letter to the Agency, dated 7 July 2010, by which Iraq submitted its initial notification to IAEA in accordance with the Additional Protocol, article 17.a. On 29 November 2010, Iraq submitted its declaration for the third quarter of 2010. Furthermore, Iraq signed the Hague Code of Conduct on 11 August 2010, thereby becoming the 131st subscribing State. Iraq acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention on 12 February 2009 and is now a member of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The Iraqi Government has put into place well-designed mechanisms to control dual-use substances and has made IAEA and OPCW aware of them. Iraq also signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in October 2008. By its decision No. 133 (2010), the Iraqi Government approved a draft law concerning accession to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. That draft law is currently before the Council of Representatives for ratification. I am also pleased to refer to the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 26 February 2010, in that statement, the President welcomed the measures taken by Iraq to comply with the disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. Iraq continues to consolidate compliance on the basis of article 9 (c) of its Constitution, which provides that the Iraqi Government shall respect and implement Iraq's international obligations regarding the non-proliferation, non-development, non-production, and non-use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and shall prohibit associated equipment, material, technologies, and delivery systems for use in the development, manufacture, production and use of such weapons.

Having fulfilled all its obligations, Iraq hopes that the Security Council will fulfil its pledges to lift the outstanding restrictions pertaining to disarmament imposed on Iraq, in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991).

(*Signed*) Hoshyar **Zebari**
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Republic of Iraq